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I.

INTRODUCTION

American courts have been significantly involved in
determining the content and scope of Indian rights and the
relationship these legal claims have with federal and state authority. 1
This jurisprudence exhibits the theoretical and practical complexity
of allocating rights and authority among overlapping national, state,
and tribal sovereignties. Moreover, unlike other common law settler
states, American Indian law is premised on the notion of an
efficacious tribal sovereignty. 2 This sovereignty pre-exists the
American state but is subsumed within the American federation. Yet
at the same time the law also exhibits a clear federal dominance; the
national government has both the right and the power to override
state and tribal authority and sovereignty in its exercise of its
constitutional authority over Indians.
This paper argues that the federal-state conflict that arose prior
to the American Civil War has profoundly influenced much of the
protective aspects of Native American jurisprudence, as found in the
seminal Marshall Court opinions. As this law developed in light of
state-federal conflict, the underlying policy and legal doctrines,
while beneficial to Native American interests, ultimately had little
to do with Indian self-determination or protective legal rules. This
Antebellum Civil War period was characterized by intense
philosophical and legal arguments concerning the nature of the
American federation. The Marshall Court in particular became an
important, if not primary, proponent of a national view of
sovereignty, which it grounded in the international sovereignty of
the national government and the 1789 constitutional text. Early
American Indian jurisprudence, which was built upon principles of
international law, pre-existing British imperial policy, and the
various policies (peaceful, aggressive, assimilative) that the nascent
United States used in dealing with the tribes, was an area in which
this debate developed. The nationalist-minded Marshall Court
essentially formulated an Indian Law which, emphasized federal
authority and left little room for the states to exercise jurisdiction
I will use the terms “Indian(s)”, “Native American(s)” and “indigenous”
interchangeably in this paper. When discussing the national and state law
concerning Indians, I will use the term Indian Law.
2 Peter Karsten, Between Law and Custom: “High and Low Legal Cultures” in
the Lands of the British Diaspora – The United States, Canada, Australia, and
New Zealand 1600 – 1900 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2002).
1
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over the tribes. At the same time, the Marshall Court used the
international aspect of Indian law to depreciate the conception of
state sovereignty advocated by the proponents of state rights. The
concomitant federal dominance of the pre-confederation
international tribes was a further justification for a national
conception of sovereignty and federal authority.
From a legal perspective these developments were not
necessarily adverse to Native American interests. Their continued
governmental existence, property rights, and law were guaranteed
by the federal government and legally enforceable. Moreover, the
legal efficacy of the Federal-Native American treaty process (which,
despite the fraud, misrepresentation, and duress that oftenaccompanied creation), set forth the mechanism by which the tribes
as governmental entities were incorporated into the American
federation. Further it established reserved rights for the tribes.
However, because they developed in the context of state-federal
conflict, the underlying legal discourse had little to do with Indian
rights, interests, or continued existence either as a moral, ethical, or
legal obligation. Rather the issue involved which jurisdiction had
primary authority over Native Americans. Indeed, the history of
American policy towards the tribes has been generally hostile
towards them as governmental entities holding distinct political and
legal rights. 3 And the affirmation of federal dominance inherent
within the Court’s tribal jurisprudence necessarily established the
basis for the extension of federal authority under the plenary power
doctrine (i.e. that the 1789 constitution grants the Federal
government complete authority over Native Americans) 4 and the
conceptual basis for the political question doctrine 5 which precluded
judicial vindication and enforcement of Native American rights.
William Bradford, “With a Very Great Blame on Our Hearts": Reparations,
Reconciliation, and an American Indian Plea for Peace with Justice, 27 AM.
INDIAN. REV. 1 (2002).
4 “The power of Congress over Indian Affairs may be of a plenary nature; but it
is not absolute." United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 329 U.S. 40, 54
(1946)(plurality opinion); The Plenary Power Doctrine is sourced in the
Commerce Power, Treaty Power and is rooted in [(as suggested in dicta by
Supreme Court in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 at 201 (2004)], “the
"preconstitutional powers" of the Federal Government. United States v. CurtissWright Export Corp, 299 U.S. 304 at 315-22 (1936).
5 “The judicial power over cases and controversies has been limited when the
question presented concerns "subject matter that the Court deems to be
inappropriate for judicial review….the Court has observed that while there is
3
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II.

AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY INTO THE 19TH CENTURY

American Indian policy after the American War of
Independence built upon British and colonial precedent. While often
honored only in the breach, the policy presumed that Indian land
cessions would be obtained by purchase and that inter-tribal
relations were not subject to colonial jurisdiction without consent of
the tribe. Prior to 1754, when the British appointed Imperial
superintendents located in North America to manage political
relations between the British and the Indians, the individual colonial
governments had primary responsibility for Indian affairs. They
negotiated their own treaties, developed policies and rules
concerning land acquisition and jurisdiction, and extended colonial
jurisdiction over particular tribes and Indians based on their
relationship to the colonial government.6 The Proclamation of 1763
sought to completely centralize colonial-Indian relations in the
Imperial Crown. It established land purchasing procedures, required
licenses and bonds for Indian traders, and sought to establish a
boundary between settled areas and tribal lands. Nevertheless, the
responsibility for interpreting and enforcing legal rules (from
whatever source) continued to be the responsibility of local colonial
officials such that in practice there remained considerable variation

"no blanket rule" regarding a judicial consideration of "whether Indians are
recognized as a tribe" the question contains "familiar attributes of political
questions." These categories of cases that have been identified share some
characteristics that make them "beyond judicial cognizance." Michalyn
Steele, Plenary Power, Political Questions, and Sovereignty in Indian Affairs,
63 UCLA L. REV. 666 at 683-4 (2016).
6 ALDEN T. VAUGHAN, NEW ENGLAND FRONTIER: PURITANS AND INDIANS,
1620-1675 (Little, Brown and Co. 1965); Yasi Kawashima, Jurisdiction of the
Colonial Courts over the Indians in Massachusetts, 1689-1763, 42 THE NEW
ENG. Q. 532 (1969); Vaughan and Kawashima describe three different
relationships that the tribes and individual Indians had with the colonial
government. The first category included those tribes who were completely
independent of colonial jurisdiction and outside of the colonies boundaries. The
second group involved tributary tribes or tribes within the colonial boundary
over which the colony had nominal jurisdiction. The third category included
those Indians who were jurisdictional treated no differently than other colonists.
See also Mark D. Walters, Mohegan Indians v. Connecticut (1705-1773) and the
Legal Status of Aboriginal and Customary Laws and Government in British
North America, 33 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 785 (1995).
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among the colonies concerning the scope of Indian rights recognized
by colonial governments. 7
Following the American Revolution, the Articles of
Confederation reflected a mixture of both the centralizing impulse
found in late pre-revolution imperial policy as well as the earlier
colony-specific approach.8 Overlaying the jurisdictional bifurcation
was the early attitude of the successful revolutionaries that Indian
tribes were “conquered” peoples who had no rights but those granted
them by the newly independent states or national government. Early
Confederation Congress committee reports emphasized that the
“right of soil” and territorial sovereignty belonged to the United
States and that tribes could “remain only on her sufferance.”9 The
result was that the individual states and United States used highhanded tactics to secure uncompensated land cessions. After some
initial successes securing cessions in this way it became apparent
that the approach was unworkable in practice. The state and national
governments lacked the military power to enforce their claimed
rights or secure ceded territory. The tribes resented the American
claims to their territory and with British support waged successful
military action against American forces and settlers. At the same
time, there was considerable disagreement between national and
state officials concerning the scope of state power over Indian
affairs.10
As the 1780s progressed there was a growing consensus that the
unilateral approach towards the tribes was neither effective nor just.
As Jones notes, the problems with the unilateral approach “forced”
Francis Paul Prucha, American Indian Policy in the Formative Years: The
Indian Trade and Intercourse Acts 1790-1834 13-20 (Univ. of Neb. Press, 1970).
8 Robert N. Clinton, “The Dormant Indian Commerce Clause,” 27 CONN. L.
REV. 1055 (1995) (Article IX reflects the disagreement concerning tension
between national authority and the extent of state control over Indians gives
Congress “the sole and exclusive rights and power of . . . regulating the trade
and managing all affairs with the Indians, not members of any of the States,
provided that the legislative right of any State within its own limits be not
infringed or violated...”).
9 Reginald Horsman, United States Indian Policies, 1776-1815, in HANDBOOK
OF NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS, VOLUME 4: HISTORY OF INDIAN-WHITE
RELATIONS 29 (William C. Sturtevant, ed., Smithsonian Inst., 1988).
10 Dorothy V. Jones notes that these initial American efforts approached Indian
affairs as “a domestic problem.” As the efforts to maintain peace, secure
American territory from other European powers and obtain land for settlement
along the frontier failed American officials were “forced to consider relations
with the Indians, rather than a unilateral policy for the Indians.” DOROTHY V.
JONES, LICENSE FOR EMPIRE COLONIALISM BY TREATY IN EARLY AMERICA 147148 (Univ. of Chicago Press, 1982).
7
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Americans officially “to consider relations with the Indians, rather
than a unilateral policy for the Indians.” As part of this new
approach, it was preferred by many policy makers that the federal
government should be given primary authority over Indian tribes
which was reflected in the 1789 constitution. In 1787, the Northwest
Ordinance set forth a new approach to dealing with tribes and
avoiding the excesses of American frontiersman and state policies.
Article III of the Ordinance in part stated:
The utmost good faith shall always be observed
towards the Indians, their lands and property shall
never be taken from them without their consent; and
in their property, rights and liberty, they never shall
be invaded or disturbed, unless in just and lawful
wars authorized by Congress; but laws founded in
justice and humanity shall from time to time be
made, for preventing wrongs being done to them, and
for preserving peace and friendship with them. 11
The Washington Administration fully implemented a renewed
commitment to treaty making, the recognition of the Native
Americans’ peaceable right to the possession of their lands, and
the purchase of land coupled with a uniform national strategy to
coordinate Indian affairs. The policy, building on the approach
outlined in Art. III of the Ordinance, sought to maintain peace,
acquire land, and regulate trade in a way that recognized that the
United States had “only limited sovereignty” over Indian
Territory and that “the limitations [on federal/state authority]
were set by the rights of the Indians inhabiting the land.” 12 It
presumed that the preferred instruments that should be used in
the Indian-American relationship were diplomatic intercourse
and treaties. The United States would obtain Indian land by
purchase. State and federal jurisdiction, if only in theory, over the
tribes was not assumed. As the tribes were in fact politically

The Northwest Ordinance, 1787;
https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=8
[https://perma.cc/V2YG-U87W].
12 JONES, supra, note 10, at 147 (At page 161 Jones points out that federal Indian
policy was partly a product of local political struggles over land because each
state laid down conditions for it to give up their claims to western Indian lands
to the national government).
11
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independent and could solicit support from Great Britain and
Spain, the policy was not only expedient but was also a
recognition that the possessory rights asserted by the tribes had a
legal basis within the American legal system. 13 The policy also
provided for the “civilization” and assimilation of the tribes, an
aspect that was increasingly emphasized in later
administrations. 14 Signatory tribes were provided with
agricultural implements, blacksmith equipment, and other sundry
items to facilitate a sedentary agricultural lifestyle. Further,
schools were established to introduce the signatory tribes to
reading, writing, and Christianity. The Trade and Intercourse
Acts of 1790, 1793, 1796, and 1799 codified this approach for
the next two decades.
With expansion of American jurisdiction across the Mississippi
watershed, federal policy underwent a dramatic shift. The Jackson
Administration viewed the treaty making process and federal
obligations that resulted from it as an “absurdity” and an
“anachronism.”15 The Administration believed that it was “farcical
to treat with the Indian tribes as though they were sovereign and
independent nations…”16 The tribes, Jackson wrote, “have only a
possessory right to the soil, for the purpose of hunting and not the
right of domain….” 17 As such, they were subject to American
national sovereignty and state jurisdiction by way of treaty, or if
necessary, without their consent. Rather than treat with the tribes to
Id. at 157-186. The recognition of aboriginal title is specifically spelled out in
the Treaty of Greenville (1795) where the United States relinquished its
jurisdictional and land title claims over previously ceded Indian land north of the
Ohio River and south of the Great Lakes. Article 5 of the Treaty states: “To
prevent any misunderstanding about the Indian lands relinquished by the United
States in the fourth article, it is now explicitly declared, that the meaning of that
relinquishment is this: the Indian tribes who have a right to those lands, are
quietly to enjoy them, hunting, planting, and dwelling thereon, so long as they
please, without any molestation from the United States; but when those tribes, or
any of them, shall be disposed to sell their lands, or any part of them, they are to
be sold only to the United States; and until such sale, the United States will
protect all the said Indian tribes in the quiet enjoyment of their lands against all
citizens of the United States, and against all other white persons who intrude
upon the same. And the said Indian tribes again acknowledge themselves to be
under the protection of the said United States, and no other power whatever.”
Article 7 of the treaty provided for the right to hunt on ceded lands mentioned in
the treaty.
14 PRUCHA, supra, note 7, at 213-224.
15 Ronald N. Satz, American Indian Policy in the Jacksonian Era 10 (Univ. of
Neb. Press 1975).
16 PRUCHA, supra, note 7 at 233.
17 Id. at 234.
13
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mediate Native American-settler relations, the Administration
believed that Indian and settler co-existence was fundamentally
incompatible. It advocated the complete removal of the tribes in the
east of the Mississippi River; a policy enacted by the Indian
Removal Act of 1830.18
The removal policy was not altogether new. It was premised on
continued use of treaties to extinguish the tribes’ interest in territory
to facilitate settlement of the frontier. “Civilization” and
assimilation remained policy objectives. In order to placate critics,
Jackson also proposed that removal would be voluntary and the
tribes would be compensated for relinquishing their lands.
Nevertheless, Jackson’s position that non-removed tribes would be
subject to state law and his refusal to prevent the extension of state
authority over territory guaranteed by treaty made emigration to the
west hardly “voluntary.” The tribes that choose to remain would be
subject to state and territorial law; a local law that state officials,
federal officials, and Native Americans understood to be destructive
of tribal political organization and lifestyle. 19 By the end of the
1840s many of the eastern tribes had removed west.
However, due to tribal resistance and outcry from various
humanitarian groups the removal policy was abandoned. The federal
government returned to treaty making to extinguish title, establish
reservation for the sole benefit of the contracting tribes, and provide
for the subsequent provision of the tribes. Meanwhile, the
reservations were extensively modified and diminished in the late
19th and early 20th centuries by way of the General Allotment Act of
1887. 20 The General Allotment Act of 1887 reversed previous
policy that sought to remove tribal governments from settler society
through the creation of reservations. Allotment was enacted in the
hope that individual Native Americans would abandon their tribal
Indian Removal Act, Ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411 (1830).
See for example, Acts of the General Assembly of the State of Georgia 1830
Section 5, “an Act to prevent the exercise of assumed and arbitrary power, by all
persons under pretext of authority from the Cherokee Indians and their laws, and
to prevent white persons from residing within that part of the chartered limits of
Georgia, occupied by the Cherokee Indians, and to provide a guard for the
protection of the gold mines, and to enforce the laws of the State within the
aforesaid territory,” 9dec. 22, 1830), Acts of the General Assembly of the State
of Georgia, Annual Session in November and December 1830 (Milledgeville:
Carmak & Ragland, 1831) at 114-117.
20 Dawes Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887).
18
19
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identity and adopt “the habits of civilized life”. 21 Nevertheless,
despite allotment and its objective of destroying tribal organisations
and the Indian cultural distinctiveness, the underlying commitment
to tribal sovereignty in law and policy continued to be the basis of
federal policy.
III.

FEDERAL SUPREMACY, STATE SOVEREIGNTY, AND
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW

A. The Problem of Sovereignty in the Antebellum United States
During the development of Federal Indian Policy discussed
above, the wider American polity was engaged in an existential
struggle over the meaning of the federal union. The fundamental
issue concerned whether the individual state governments or the
federal government were the primary sovereign governmental entity
in the American federation. The controversy surrounding this issue
of sovereignty revolved around those who advocated that the
sovereign authority resided in Congress and the federal government
(the Theory of National Supremacy) and those who located it in the
states (the Compact Theory). Both theories accepted John Locke’s
idea that individuals voluntarily unite together in political bodies to
promote mutual safety and advantage, and that by doing so, they
establish a governmental authority to which every citizen subjects
themselves.22 Both theories assumed that the people were the only
true “sovereign” entity who in turn delegated their authority to the
governmental entity. Thus:
The government...of the state, is that portion, only
of the sovereignty, which is by the constitution
entrusted to the public functionaries: these are the
agents and servants of the people.”23

D.S. Otis, The Dawes Act and the Allotment of Indian Lands, UNIV. OF OKLA.
PRESS at 7 (1973).
22 “The commonwealth seems to me to be a society of men constituted only for
preserving and advancing their civil goods....It is the duty of the civil magistrate,
by impartially enacted equal laws, to preserve and secure for all the people in
general, and for every one of his subjects in particular, the just possession of
these things that belong to this life.” John Locke, Letter on Toleration 65-67
(John Gough ed., Clarendon Press 1968).
23 Sir William Blackstone, Blackstone’s Commentaries Vol. 1 app. 7., (St.
George Tucker ed., 1969).
21
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The difference between the two theories was whether the primary
political society in the American federation was co-extensive with
the state polities or was national in scope. This issue resolved itself
into differing perspectives on the nature of the act or agreement that
led to the ratification of the 1789 United States Constitution.
The Theory of National Supremacy looked to the language of
the Preamble of the 1789 Constitution. 24 It was premised on the
Lockean idea that the federal government was an act of the entire
people of the United States who created civil and political society as
a means to protect themselves from the vicissitudes of the state of
nature. Therefore, it was not a creation of the state’s themselves.25
The Marshall Court was a leading exponent of this view in its
national jurisprudence. In McCulloch v. Maryland, the court stated
the position forcefully. “The government,” the court declared,
“proceeds directly from the people”:
It is established in the name of the people...in order
to form a more perfect union, establish justice, ensure
domestic tranquility, and ensure the blessings of
liberty to themselves and their prosperity. 26
The fact that the national government had enumerated powers
related only to its capacity to do certain tasks, and it did not diminish
its overall pre-eminence in the federal system. From this
perspective, the states were not co-equal sovereigns independent of
the federal government. Rather, they acted as complementary but
24The

Preamble to the Constitution of the United States reads: “We the People of
the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice,
insure domestic Tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the
general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our
Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of
America.” U.S. CONST. pmbl.
25 “Whenever, therefore, any number of men so unite into one society, as to quit
everyone his executive power of the law of nature, and to resign it to the public,
there, and there only, is a political, or civil society. And this is done wherever
any number of men, in the state of nature, enter into a society to make one
people, one body politic, under one supreme government, or else when anyone
joins himself to and incorporates with, any government already made.” John
Locke, An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent and End of Civil
Government, in MAN AND THE STATE: THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHERS (107-108
(Saxe Commines and Robert N. Linscott eds., 1947). For a discussion of the
Lockean precepts to John Marshall’s jurisprudence see ROBERT KENNETH
FAULKNER, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF JOHN MARSHALL (Princeton University
Press, 1968).
26 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 403-404 (1819) [hereafter McCulloch].
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necessarily inferior governments. As stated by Chief Justice John
Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden:
The genius and character of the whole government
seem to be, that its action is to be applied to all the
external concerns of the nation, and to those internal
concerns which affect the States generally; but not to
those which are completely within a particular State,
which do not affect other States, and with which it is
necessary to interfere, for the purpose of executing
some of the general powers of government. 27
From this formulation, it followed that a state could not exclude
federal authority, nor could it prevent the federal government from
pursuing federal objectives within its territory. Like the state
government, the federal government acted directly on the individual.
It did not act through the instrumentalities of the state. As such, the
federal government had both the authority and duty to promulgate,
execute, and enforce its laws throughout the nation. 28
The Theory of National Supremacy not only held that the
language of the 1789 Constitution established the preeminence of
the federal government, but it also assumed that the federal
government was the successor in interest to the British Crown. As
such, it possessed international sovereignty, which was not held by
the states. 29 This authority was formally transferred by the treaty
ending the Revolutionary War. As the court observed in Johnson v.
M’Intosh:
By the treaty which concluded the war of our
revolution, Great Britain relinquished all claim, not
only to the government, but also the "propriety and
territorial rights of the United States....By this treaty,
the powers of government, and the right to the soil,
which had previously been in Great Britain, passed
definitively to these States [sic].30

Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 195 (1824).
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264 (1821).
29 See FRANCES HOWELL RUDKO, JOHN MARSHALL AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW: STATESMAN AND CHIEF JUSTICE ( 1991).
30 Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 584 (1823).
27
28
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Nonetheless, in spite of the positive transfer of authority and
proprietary rights by Great Britain in the Treaty in 1783, the court’s
claim to federal international sovereignty from this perspective is
was not the equal to that proposition that the 1789 Constitution
conferred supremacy in international affairs to the national
government at the time the Constitution was ratified. This second
proposition suggests that the national government, as a creation of
the “sovereign” states is entrusted by those states to engage in
foreign relations on their behalf. Rather, the court posited that the
individual states themselves never had international standing under
positive or customary international law at any time. As stated by
Justice Story in his Commentaries on the Constitution of the United
States:
From the moment of the declaration of
independence, if not for most purposes at an
antecedent period, the united colonies must be
considered as being a nation de facto, having a
general government over it created, and acting by the
general consent of the people of all the colonies. The
powers of that government were not, and indeed
could not be well defined. But its exclusive
sovereignty, in many cases, was firmly established;
and its controlling power over the states was in most,
if not all national measures, universally admitted. 31
Thus, the international aspect of the federal government was
accompanied by the accruements of international sovereignty. This
international sovereignty was never held by the states and was
always denied the states. Instead the federal government’s
international sovereignty arose from the initial collective steps of the
individual colonies to resist British sovereignty. And it was not
related in any way to state sovereignty or the institutional
arrangements by which the states transferred authority to the
national government in the 1781 Articles of Confederation or the
1789 Constitution.

JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES VOL. 1 203 (1970); Marshall wrote Story regarding his Commentaries
stating, “It is a subject [the constitution] on which we concur exactly. Our
opinions on it are, I believe, identical.” ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF
JOHN MARSHALL VOL. 4 569-70 (1919).
31
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The court supported its position that the national government
had international sovereignty to which the states could never be
competent by observing that other international states had only
recognized the national government (either the Continental
Congress or the Confederation Congress) prior to the 1789
Constitution; that the 1789 Treaty Power 32 presumed international
recognition by other sovereign states; that only the federal
government had the right to wage both offensive and defensive war,
and opining that no authority was superior to the federal government
when it was exercising its enumerated powers.
Proponents of the Compact Theory were vehement opponents of
this view. Supporters of the Compact Theory generally subscribed
to the idea that the federal government resulted from a compact
between the states “as states” and was not the creation of the
American people in their sovereign capacity. The supporters of this
theory (the Compact Theory) argued that all the national
governments of the United States (the Continental Congresses, the
Confederation Congress, and the 1789 Federal Government) were
the creation of independent and sovereign states, and that the
national government exercised no authority over the states or the
people that the states did not themselves possess prior to its creation.
They claimed that the 1789 Constitution, despite the language of the
preamble, the various powers granted the federal government, and
limitations of state jurisdiction, in no way diminished the underlying
sovereignty and authority of each state. The federal government had
neither domestic nor international pre-eminence but had a residual
sovereignty and a paramount interest in international affairs. From
this perspective the United States was simply a confederated
republic similar to the Swiss confederation described by Swiss
international law theorist Emmerich Vattel:
In short, several sovereign and independent states
may unite themselves together by perpetual
Art. VI, sec. 3 of the U.S. Constitution reads “This Constitution, and the Laws
of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be
the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.” A treaty “is in its nature a contract between two nations.”
Where it is negotiated and ratified with the consent of two-thirds of the Senate it
is “to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an Act of the legislature.”
Foster and Elam v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829).
32
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confederacy, without each ceasing to be a perfect
state. They will form together a federal republic:
deliberations in common will offer no violence to the
sovereignty of each member, though they may, in
certain respects put some constraints on the exercise
of it, in virtue of voluntary engagements. A person
does not cease to be free and independent, when he
is obliged to fulfil the engagements into which he
willingly entered.33
The Compact Theory squarely posited that the states, as states, were
the original Lockean civil society. From the moment of the 1776
Declaration of Independence, each individual colony became a de
facto and de jure independent sovereign state in the domestic and
international spheres. They had behaved as such at the Continental
Congresses. 34 These independent states then entered into the
Articles of Confederation and the 1789 Constitution in order to
manage certain affairs common to them all. The powers of the 1789
national government were specifically enumerated powers, which
partook a sovereign quality in the area of international relations, but
in no way did the 1789 national government’s exercise of their
powers diminish the sovereignty of the individual states. As such,
the individual states and the federal government were co-equal
sovereigns under the 1789 Constitution. 35 As co-equal sovereigns,
each state could judge the content of federal statutes and judge the
constitutionality of particular federal acts, notwithstanding the
national judiciary or other national political branches.

Emmerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations or Principles of the Law of Nature
Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns 18 (Luke White,
trans., 1792). Vattel’s 1758 Treatise was the most important works on the law of
nations in the eighteenth century. Vattel was cited as a major source of
contemporary wisdom on questions of international law in the American
Revolution and in the early period of the republic.
34 Claude H. Van Tyne, Sovereignty in the American Revolution: An Historical
Study, 12 AM. HIST. REV. 529 (1907).
35 See Jefferson to Samuel H. Smith, August 2, 1823 in which the former
president referred to the national and state governments as “two coordinate
governments, each sovereign and independent in its department....The one may
be strictly called the Domestic branch of government which is sectional but
sovereign, the other the foreign branch of government equally sovereign on its
own side of the line....” JEAN SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL: DEFINER OF A NATION
664 (1996).
33
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In the decades following President Washington’s tenure, the
Compact Theory gained more adherents. 36 As partisan fervor rose
between the Federalist Party and the nascent DemocraticRepublican Party of Thomas Jefferson, the Democrats emphasized
the idea of state assent to the Union and the principle of
undiminished state sovereignty to argue for a more limited notion of
federal authority.37 Less than a decade after ratification of the 1789
Constitution, Jefferson declared that the powers of the federal
government were the result of a “compact to which the states are
parties.” This compact was one where “each state acceded [to it] as
a state” and one in which each state “is an integral party.” 38 Later,
in McCulloch, the counsel for Maryland explicitly put forth this
argument against national authority. 39 The position was advanced
by Georgia in the Cherokee cases (1829-1834) and the state of South
Carolina in the 1832 tariff dispute. In these disputes, both states
argued, consistent with Compact Theory, that the national
government had no authority to enforce federal legislation. Further,
Georgia and South Carolina insisted that each individual state
retained an absolute right to judge for itself the constitutionality of
various federal laws.40
B. Conceptions of Sovereignty and State and Indian Land Rights in
Antebellum America
1. Sovereignty and International Law
During the Marshall Court era (1804-1835), international law
theorists posited that the sovereignty of a state consisted of two

During the debate regarding the ratification of the 1789 Constitution, the
constitutional convention had recognized that legislative ratification of the
Articles of Confederation undermined the authority of the national government.
For example, James Madison stated in 1788 that “among the defects of the
confederation, that in Many of the States, it had received no higher sanction than
a mere legislative ratification.” ALEXANDER HAMILTON, JAMES MADISON &
JOHN JAY, THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 224 (Bantam Books 1982).
37 Stanley Elkins & Eric McKitrick, The Age of Federalism 719-726 (1993).
38 Joseph Story, supra, note 31 Commentaries on the Constitution of the United
States 329 (Da Capo Press 1970).
39 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 363-369 (1819).
40 Albert J. Beveridge, The Life of John Marshall Vol. 4 555-573 (1919).
36
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parts: internal sovereignty and external sovereignty. 41 Internal
sovereignty is the “right of control” which is inherent in the people
of any state, or vested in its ruler, by the constitution or by municipal
law.42 As the Vattel noted:
Every Nation which governs itself, under whatever
form [democracy, aristocratic, monarchy], and
which does not depend on any other Nation, is a
sovereign State. Its rights are, in the natural order,
the same as those of every other State. Such is the
character of the moral persons who live together in a
society established by nature and subject to the Law
of Nations. To give a nation the right to a definite
position in this great society, it need only to be truly
sovereign and independent; it must govern itself by
its own authority and its own laws. [emphasis in
original]43
The sovereign state had both the right and duty to preserve its
existence and expect the obedience of individuals who lived within
its border to abide by its rules.
When men, by the act of associating together, form a
State or Nation, each individual agrees to procure the
common good of all, and together agree to assist each
in obtaining the means of providing for his needs and
to protect and defend him.44
This control over individuals and the competence to make law or
legislate and bind the political society differentiated the sovereign
state from a non-sovereign state. “Sovereignty” as international

I owe this topology to Henry Wheaton. Wheaton was the Court Reporter for
the Marshall Court from 1816 and 1827. He oversaw twelve volumes of the U.S.
Reports. HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (William
Beach Lawrence ed., 6th ed.1855).
42 Id. at 29-30.
43 Emmerich De Vattel, Le Droit des Gens, ou Principes de la Loi Naturelle,
appliques a la Conduite et aux Affairs des Nations et des Souverains, in THE
CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 11 (George D. Gregory trans., James Brown
Scott ed.,1964).
44 Id. at 13.
41
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theorist Pufendorf stated, “is properly used only as over men....” 45
The ability to bind members of the society must be paramount
within that society.
Regarding internal sovereignty, American legal theory posited
that actual sovereignty rested with the American people. 46
Government has a derivative sovereignty which was the result of the
erection of some governmental authority. 47 The Marshall Court
accepted this proposition as axiomatic of the American experiment.
As the court stated in Marbury v. Madison:
That the people have an original right to establish for
their future government, such principles, as in their
opinion, shall most conduce to their own happiness
is the very basis on which the whole American fabric
has been erected.48
The sovereignty of the people, upon the creation of the state and
national governments, was the assertion of the absolute right of
control within the territory of the United States. As Chief Justice
Marshall noted:
The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory
is necessarily exclusive and absolute.
It is
Samuel Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae et Gentium Libri Octo,” in THE CLASSICS
585 (C.H. Oldfather & W.A. Oldfather trans., James
Brown Scott ed., 1964).
46 “It has been thought a considerable advance towards establishing the
principles of Freedom to say that Government is a compact between those who
govern and those who are governed; but this cannot be true, because itis putting
the effect before the cause; for as man must have existed before governments
existed, there necessarily was a time when governments did not exist, and
consequently there could originally exist no governors to form such a compact
with. The fact therefore must be that the individuals themselves, each in his own
personal and sovereign right, entered into a compact with each other to produce
a government: and this is the only mode in which governments have a right to
arise, and the only principle on which they have a right to exist. THOMAS
PAINE, THE RIGHTS OF MAN (1974) 35 (Hypatia Bradlaugh Bonner ed.,
1937).
47 “Power in the People is like in the sun, native, original, inherent, and
unlimited, by anything human. In government it may be compared to the
reflected light of the moon; for it is only borrowed, delegated and limited by the
intention of the people, whose it is, and whom governors are to consider
themselves responsible....” William Blackstone, Blackstone’s Commentaries
Vol 1. app. 9 (St. George Tucker ed., 1969) (quoting Burgh, Political
Disquisitions, vol. 1, c. 2).
48 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176 (1803).
45
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susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself.
Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an
external source, would imply a diminution of its
sovereignty to the extent of the restriction.... 49
In McIlvaine v. Coxe’s Lessee, the court ruled that the internal
sovereignty of the United States was complete from the time the
states declared themselves independent. 50
Contrary to internal sovereignty which is premised on the
exercise of exclusive authority within a territory, external
sovereignty is the sovereignty conferred upon a sovereign state by it
engaging in intercourse with other sovereign states. A state which
possesses internal sovereignty and control does not need to seek
external sovereignty as it is completely independent. However, if a
state wishes to engage in the obligations and rights of states, to
benefit from that society of nations, then it must be recognized as
being sovereign in an external sense. International sovereign states
are juridically equal regardless of their actual internal and external
power.
The society or community of international states or nations is
where the international relations of a state are maintained. There are
no rights bestowed on individuals. Rather, the rights and duties are
owed to other members of the society of nations. The issues, for the
most part, are those of war, peace, and commerce. External
sovereignty is evidenced by the use of treaties for peace, alliances,
or commerce in external relations and the use of force on external
neighbors in defense of the sovereign state.
The Marshall Court subscribed to the view that external
sovereignty was a function of recognition by other states. This
concern was partially the result of the fact that some states, such as
the revolutionary United States, in their efforts to become
independent, had no practical means of entering the society of
nations without recognition. Prior to recognition and entry into the
society of sovereign states, international law conferred no rights
upon a rebellious state, a colony, or an internally sovereign state.
International law had no concern for the rebellious or revolutionary
state, other than the developing law of neutrality, and the law did
not consider the revolutionary state worthy of recognition. Rather,
49
50

Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon & Others, 11 U.S. 116, 136 (1812).
McIlvaine v. Coxe’s Lessee, 29 U.S. 209, 211 (1808).
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in these types of internal conflict, the rights and duties of the
sovereign asserting a right of dominion were to be considered as
dispositive by other sovereign states. The Court in Rose v. Himely,
which involved the seizure of a ship by the rebellious colony of St.
Domingo, recognized the importance of the assertions of claims of
sovereignty by a state recognized under the law of nations:
It has been argued, that the colony, having declared
itself a sovereign state, and having thus far
maintained its sovereignty by arms, must be
considered and treated by other nations, as a
sovereign in fact, and as being entitled to maintain
the same intercourse with the world that is
maintained by other belligerent nations. In support
of this argument, the doctrines of Vattel have been
particularly referred to. But the language of that
writer is obviously addressed to sovereigns, not to
courts. It is for governments to decide, whether they
will consider St. Domingo as an independent nation,
and until such decision shall be made, or France shall
relinquish her claim, courts of justice must consider
the ancient state of things as remaining unaltered,
and the sovereign power of France over that colony
as still subsisting.51
Thus, recognition was in many ways tantamount to actual
independence and sovereignty regardless of a particular
revolutionary government’s dominion and authority over its
territory or the efforts by an established sovereign to prevent
statehood. As such, the failure of the international community to
recognize the individual states (as opposed to the national
government which was recognized) during the revolutionary was
evidence of their diminished sovereignty within the American
federation.
2. Doctrine of Discovery
The issue of who would control the alienation of Indian lands in
the post-revolutionary period and who had jurisdiction over the
51

Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. 241, 271 (1808).
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tribes brought into sharp focus the divergent theoretical
underpinnings of the American federation discussed above. The
three contending legal doctrines on the legal status and rights of
Indian tribes were the Doctrine of Discovery, the Doctrine of the
Landed States, and the Doctrine of Natural Rights. Each had a
different conception of Indian rights, which, in turn, supported a
different interest in the debate concerning who would control the
sale and settlement of frontier lands. Ultimately, the issue involved
which level of government could claim pre-eminent status as a
receptacle of the sovereign will of the American people. The
Marshall Court was the fulcrum of the debate and systematically
undermined the legal positions that would challenge federal
supremacy.
The Doctrine of Discovery, as articulated by Chief Justice
Marshall in Johnson v. M’Intosh, holds that Indians maintained
occupancy rights subject to the right of extinguishment by the
federal government. Any other extinguishment of Indian title or
alienation of Indian land title by either Indians or the states was void
under this Doctrine.52
The Doctrine of Discovery was perhaps most forcefully asserted
in the Royal Proclamation of 1763. The Proclamation stated that the
Indians had a continued right to occupancy in their lands subject to
the Crown’s right of first purchase. 53 The rights of Indians to lands
not ceded or purchased by the Crown were reserved for the
occupying Indians. Private citizens were strictly enjoined from
making purchases and settlements from the Indians without license
from the Crown. The federal government asserted this claim as
successor in interest to the Crown, as well as under the 1789 federal
Constitution, which granted the federal government the authority to
regulate commerce “with the Indian Tribes”, and its treaties were
declared to be supreme law.

The doctrine was extensively debated, by both proponents and critics. Its
critics in international law were many. Grotius, for example did not recognize
discovery as establishing full title. Pufendorf noted “The bare seeing a thing or
the knowing where it is, is not judged sufficient title of Possession.” M.F.
LINDLEY, THE ACQUISITION AND GOVERNMENT IN BACKWARD TERRITORY 131
(1926) (quoting Pufendorf).
53 For an in-depth discussion of the Proclamation see Robert N. Clinton, The
Proclamation of 1763: Colonial Prelude to Two Centuries of Federal-States
Conflict Over the Management of Indian Affairs, 69 BOS. UNIV. L. REV. 329
(1989).
52
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The Doctrine of Discovery was grounded in positive
international law. 54 Positive international law assumed that
dominion or sovereignty of newly discovered territory need not
depend upon ownership of property, but rather, was grounded on the
consent of other state actors to the "principal of exclusivity"
regarding the newly discovered territory. The states whose
"sovereign" consent was considered necessary were those European
states engaged in discovery and conquest. The principle of
exclusivity overlay a more fundamental premise of the international
system; that all title ultimately rests upon the sword or the preemptive power of the state to purchase land. Hugo Grotius, the
international legal theorist, stated that:
[A]ccording to the law of nations, not only the
person, who makes war upon just grounds; but any
one whatever, engaged in regular and formal war,
becomes absolute proprietor of everything which he
takes from the enemy: so that all nations respect his
title, and the title of all, who derive through him their
claim to such possessions.55
The Doctrine of Discovery had little room for either the "noncivilized" states or for the indigenous inhabitants of territory
claimed by European states. 56 The exclusivity claimed by one
international actor necessarily derogated the sovereign rights of the
indigenous peoples regardless of the actual state of affairs on the
ground. European legal theorists simply side-stepped the issue of
"actual" tribal control of the land by denying that indigenous states
had sovereignty in the international sphere. It then followed that the
claims and rights of any indigenous inhabitants were subordinate to
those of the first European discoverer and that discoverer's
successors. The legal relations governing the discoverer and the
indigenous people were determined by the internal law of the
F. Von Der Heydte, “Discovery and Annexation in International Law” 29 AM.
J. OF INT’L L. 448 (1935).
55 HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 335 (A.C. Campbell trans.,
M. Walter Dunne, ed., 1901).
56 For example, Pope Alexander's Papal Bull of 1493 whereby he sought to
divide the new world between Spain and Portugal. The Pope reserved from his
grant to Spain all lands which had been occupied by any other "Christian"
nation. Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law, in THE CLASSICS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 201-202 (James F. Scott ed., 1936).
54
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discoverer. This law could either protect the ownership rights of the
tribes and individual Indians or be destructive of their interests. In
any event, the Doctrine of Discovery provided no legal basis for the
tribes to assert any rights under international law or within the
domestic law of the European discoverer.
3. Doctrine of the Landed States
The "landed" states were those states which had colonial
charters that granted them land beyond the Appalachian
Mountains. 57 The charters, in one form or another, had granted
the colonies who held them all title and ownership of land held by
the Crown within the prescribed limits of the charter, whether or
not the land was occupied by Indians. The states asserted a right to
control and alienate Indian lands based on their Crown charters and
their sovereignty as states gained in the revolutionary struggle.
It has been argued that these claims to the frontier land were
essentially a legal formulation by elites in each landed state to secure
western lands from the central government after the revolution freed
the colonies from British control. 58 Be this as it may, the landed
states did not derive their claim over Indian lands from positive
international law or prerogatives of the British Crown. Rather, the
doctrine was based upon a Lockean conception of society and
property. Locke argued that things in nature which were removed
from their natural state by human labor became an individual's
property.59 For those who settled the frontier, Locke stated that "he
who appropriates land to himself by his labor, does not lessen but
increases the common stock of mankind. [emphasis in original]"60
Concomitant with the appropriation of property from nature for the
private good, free individuals have the right to consent to

The "landed" states included Virginia, New York, New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, Connecticut, South Carolina, North Carolina, and Georgia. The
landless states included Maryland, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Delaware, New
Jersey.
58 Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 1776-1787 162-196
(1969).
59 John Locke, Two Treatise of Government in MAN AND THE STATE: THE
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHERS 327-329 (Saxe Commines & Robert N. Linscott eds.,
1963).
60 Id. at 336.
57
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government to order their relations. The consent of individuals to
the creation of government is the basis of sovereignty. 61
The resultant formula held that individuals and their sovereign
states had both the right and duty to possess and develop the wild
and vacant lands held by the Indians. Thomas Jefferson stated this
thesis in "A Summary View of the Rights of British America" in
1774:
The fictitious principle that all lands belong
originally to the king, they [the colonists] were early
persuaded to believe real, and accordingly took
grants of their own from the crown....It is time
therefore for us to lay this matter before his majesty,
and to declare that he has no right to grant lands of
himself. From the nature and purpose of civil
institutions, all the lands within the limits which any
particular society has circumscribed around itself,
are assumed by that society, and subject to their
allotment; this may be done by themselves,
assembled collectively, or by their legislature, to
whom they may have delegated sovereign authority.
And if they are allotted in neither of these ways, each
individual of the society may appropriate to himself
such lands as he finds vacant, and occupancy will
give him title.62
Additionally, the fact that Indians generally used territory for
hunting rather than agriculture gave additional impetus to the idea
that the Americans could appropriate land under Lockean
justifications.63
Thomas Paine, The Rights of Man 103-106 (1974).
Thomas Jefferson, A Summary View of the Rights of British America, in THE
PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON 18-19 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1985).
63 For example, John Quincy Adams in 1802 discussed the scope of the Indians’
possessory rights. “The Indian right of possession itself stands, with regard to
the greatest part of the country upon a questionable foundation. Their cultivated
fields, their constructed habitations, a space of ample sufficiency for their
subsistence, and whatever they had annexed to themselves by personal labor,
was undoubtably by the laws of nature theirs. But what is the right of a
huntsman [?][sic]...Shall the lordly savage not only disdain the virtues and
enjoyments of civilization himself, but shall he control the civilization of a
world? Shall he forbid the wilderness to blossom like a rose? Shall he forbid the
61
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While the Doctrine of Discovery essentially posited that the
sovereign claim was an "exclusionist act" to keep other sovereigns
out, the Doctrine of Landed States claimed that state sovereignty
over the Indian frontier arose from the cultivation and habitation of
land by citizens of the state government who is asserting
sovereignty. In this sense, Indian title and jurisdiction over Indians
was also a matter controlled by municipal law. Civil society did not
protect the interests of aboriginals who engaged in occupations such
as hunting. However, where the Doctrine of Discovery was
essentially unconcerned about the rights of indigenous inhabitants,
the Doctrine of the Landed States denied at the level of theory that
Indians held anything more than temporary occupancy rights or that
they were sovereign in any respect due to their non-agricultural
existence and incompetence to form a civil society.
4. Doctrine of Natural Rights of Indians
The natural rights of the Indians to own and possess their
territory in a manner that would be upheld by American courts were
supported by those who wished to protect individual purchases from
them. If tribes could convey full title in fee, huge land purchases
from them would benefit land speculators who were moving west
ahead of state and federal authority. This perspective necessitated a
legal position that held that tribes were independent entities on the
international plane and that individual Indians had the same natural
rights, particularly with respect to property, as Europeans.
The Doctrine of Natural Rights of Indians had two primary
sources. First, the doctrine extended the logic of Locke and his
Republican proponents in America to individual Indians and Indian
tribes. Samuel Wharton, a long-time speculator and member of the
Continental Congress, set forth this view in the 1781 pamphlet
“Plain Facts: Being an Examination into the Rights of the Indian
Nations of America to their Respective Countries,” which he
published to persuade the delegates to affirm land company claims

oaks of the forest to fall before the axe of industry and rise again transformed
into habitations of ease and elegance?" Howard R. Beram, The Concept of
Aboriginal Rights in the Early Legal History of the United States, 27 BUFF. L.
REV. 637, 639-640 (1978) (quoting John Quincy Adams).
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in Virginia’s proposed northwest cession.64 Wharton declared that
Indians followed the "first immutable law of nature” in exercising
their God-Given rights of self-preservation—rights that necessarily
included the right to acquire, hold, and alienate property. 65 Because
the Indians had natural rights, Europeans could not deprive them of
the use and enjoyment of their dominions. Unless the particular tribe
was conquered, the law of these societies remained in effect. Nonconquered Indians could sell their land to whomever they pleased,,
and the federal and state governments were bound to recognize the
conveyance.66
Second, the Doctrine of Natural Rights outright rejected the
idea that the discovery of new lands extinguished the proprietary
rights of the Indians as a matter of international law. This point of
view was exposited by Victoria, a Dominican priest and legal
theorist. Victoria stated that Indians “were true owners, both from
the public and private standpoint” and that the “discovery of them
by the Spaniards had no more effect on their property than the
discovery of the Spaniards by the Indians had on Spanish property.”
67

C. Federal and State Sovereignty and the Early Indian Cases
These various conceptions of state, federal and Indian
sovereignty and rights, promoted by different contending interests
in early American society, clashed in the seminal Marshall Court
Indian law cases. The impact of these foundational opinions,
Fletcher v. Peck, Johnson v. M’Intosh, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,
and Worcester v. Georgia, has been much disputed. Robert A.
Samuel Warton, Plain facts: Being an Examination into the Rights of the
Indian Nations of America, to their respective Countries; And a Vindication of
the Grant from the Six United Nations of Indians, to The Proprietors of Indiana,
Against the Decision of the Legislature of Virginia Together With Authentic
Documents Proving That the Territory, Westward of the Allegany Mountain,
never belonged to Virginia (1781),
https://archive.org/details/plainfactsbeinge00whar; See also James D. Anderson,
Samuel Wharton and the Indians' Rights to Sell Their Land: An EighteenthCentury View, 63, The W. Pa. Hist. Mag. 121 (1980); Robert A. Williams Jr.,
Like a Loaded Weapon: The Rehnquist Court, Indian Rights, and the Legal
History of Racism in America 298-300 (2005).
65 Id. at 4-5.
66 Id.at 26-28, 112.
67 Felix S. Cohen, Original Indian, 32 MINN. L. REV. 28, 45 (1947). See also
Felix S. Cohen, The Spanish Origin of Indian Rights in the Law of the United
States, 31 GEO. L.J. 1 (1942).
64

173

Williams argues that these early opinions of Chief Justice John
Marshall were representative of, or “reinforced”,”, racial stereotypes
that justified the savagery and injustices inflicted upon the tribes by
the colonial project and the ascendancy of white American
civilization. 68 Lindsay Robertson has argued that the Johnson v.
M’Intosh opinion was crafted by Justice Marshall to address several
contemporary political problems between Virginia and Kentucky
concerning land grants to revolutionary war veterans. He argues that
Marshall’s opinion went beyond the legal issues in the M’Intosh
case (which according to Robertson concerned the effect of the
Royal Proclamation of 1763 on pre-revolutionary war Indian land
purchases), so that Marshall could ground sovereign title under the
Discovery doctrine and establish a precedent to extend state
jurisdiction over the tribes in a manner which ignored both inherent
tribal rights to autonomy and federal constitutional prerogatives.69
Yet these cases, despite the use of racist language, images of
Indian savagery and Marshall’s immediate political objectives,
fundamentally espouse a notion of federal supremacy over the
states and tribes. Placed in the context of the federal-state dispute
and the various justifications for the legal efficacy of Indian rights,
Robert A. Williams Jr., Like A Loaded Weapon: The Rehnquist Court, Indian
Rights, And The Legal History Of Racism In America (2005).
69 LINDSAY G. ROBERTSON, CONQUEST BY LAW: HOW THE DISCOVERY OF
AMERICA DISPOSSESSED INDIGENOUS PEOPLES OF THEIR LANDS 77-94 (New
York: Oxford University Press (2005)); See e.g. Caldwell v. State, 1 Ala. 327 at
327, 470-72 (1832), where Taylor, J. of the Supreme Court of Alabama writes
“After a patient and laborious investigation, I can find nothing, either in ancient
charters; the conduct of any European power, or the opinion of any respectable
writer of older date than 1825, which tends in the remotest degree to
countenance the opinion that the Indian tribes have ever been considered as
distinct and independent communities. In the language of Chief Justice
Marshall, in the case of Johnson vs. McIntosh, “discovery gave an exclusive
right to extinguish the Indian title of occupancy either by purchase or conquest;
and gave them” (the discoverers) “also, a right to such a degree of sovereignty
as the circumstances of the people would allow them to exercise.” “The
circumstances of the people” did not “allow them to exercise” jurisdiction over
many of the tribes within the limits of the colonies at an early day." Those tribes
lived beyond their reach or control, and wandered over immense forests which
the people of the colonies never had penetrated, and within and beyond which,
they had no intercourse. But so fast as these forests disappeared before their
extending settlements, and those once distant tribes were brought within reach of
the laws, and in contact with the settlements of their civilized and more powerful
neighbors; so far, in fine, “as the circumstances of the people would allow them
to exercise” jurisdiction and sovereignty over their persons and their country;
thus fast they were brought under the influence of those laws, and compelled to
yield to that jurisdiction and sovereignty.”
68
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the Court’s notion of national supremacy necessarily enhanced
tribal sovereignty when it grounded national and international
sovereignty in the federal government. The Court accepted the idea
of legally enforceable Indian property rights and recognized that
tribes were self-governing entities within the American legal
system. Moreover, as part of the effort to demonstrate that the
national government was supreme within the American federation,
the Court compared and contrasted tribes with the states –
emphasizing the historical reality of the sovereign and independent
tribes to the dependent colonial non-sovereign status of the states.
Yet the Court’s conception of national power, with its
demonstration that federal authority both trumped and subsumed the
pre-existing sovereign tribes, also established that Indian rights were
ultimately subject to federal power; and their rights and possessions
could be disregarded without their consent or legal intervention by
the courts. This “legal discourse of empire” over the Indians fully
surfaced only after the triumph of the nationalist conception of
sovereignty in the American Civil War with the abandonment of the
treaty-making in 1871 by Congress and articulation of the plenary
power doctrine in United States v. Kagama and Lone Wolf v.
Hitchcock.70 In this sense, American Indian law is imbricated with
the sovereign and institutional prerogatives of the national state and
the socio-economic dominance of the American settlers.
Nevertheless, the contest over which level of government is supreme
within the federal structure carved out a set of legal principles and
legal doctrines that are modestly solicitous of Indian rights. Despite
legislative policies directed towards assimilation and the judicial reinterpretations that have significantly narrowed the scope of tribal
sovereignty, these principles continue to inform Indian
jurisprudence.
1. Fletcher v. Peck
In Fletcher v. Peck, the Marshall Court held that a Georgia
statute, which annulled a previous conveyance of public lands
authorized by a prior enactment, as violative of the obligation of
contracts clause (Art. I, § 10) of the Constitution.71 While essentially

United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187
U.S. 553 (1903).
71 The Contracts Clause is found at U.S. Const. art. I, §X
70
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a contracts clause case, Fletcher v. Peck remains the first major case
regarding the nature of tribal rights and Indian title. The case
involved a grant of land by the State of Georgia to an individual.
Only Indians occupied the land. After several years, the original
grant was rescinded by the Georgia legislature because of alleged
undue influence by various interested individuals at the time of the
original grant.
Considering the question of Georgia’s right to convey the land,
the Court directly confronted the issue of whether the state had title
to it. The plaintiff argued that Georgia was never seized of the land
at the time of conveyance, so there was no valid conveyance.
Instead, it was the property of either the United States or the Indians.
He argued that the reservation of land for the Indians in the
Proclamation of 1763 “excepts the lands on the western waters from
the colonies within whose bounds they would otherwise have
been....” As these lands were not part of Georgia at the
commencement of the War of Independence, but were acquired in
the war, the actual title lay with the United States, not Georgia. Such
conquests, the plaintiff argued, were "made by joint arms, for the
joint benefit of the United States, and not for the benefit of any
particular state." 72 As Georgia did not own the land, the
conveyance was void.
The Court rejected this argument. “The question of whether the
vacant lands within the United States became joint property or
belonged to the separate states… at one time threatened to shake the
American confederacy to its foundation.” It would not disturb the
compromise. 73 Instead, title to all lands conquered or occupied
during the War of Independence went to “the people of the several
states.”
[A]ll the right and Royal prerogatives devolved upon
the people of the several states, to be exercised in
such manner as they should prescribe, and by such
governments as they should erect. The right of
disposing of the lands belonging to a state naturally
devolved upon the legislative body; who were to
enact such laws as should authorize the sale and
conveyance of them.74

Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87 at 125, 142 (1810).
Id. at 142.
74 Id. at 121.
72
73
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With the rejection of the idea that the western lands were held in
fee simple by the United States, the Court needed to consider the
nature of the conveyance. The dilemma facing the Court on this
issue was acute. In 1802, Georgia had conveyed all the interest it
had in the frontier lands to the federal government when the 1796
Non-Intercourse Act was renewed. 75 In this session, the parties
agreed that Indian lands would be preserved from seizure or entry
without their consent and that Indian rights would be defended
against white settlers by the federal government.76 However, prior
to this 1802 cession, the Georgia legislature had “vested absolutely”
those lands in a private individual. The Fletcher Court noted,,"[T]he
grant, when issued, conveyed an estate in fee simple to the
grantee,...This estate is transferable." 77 Yet this perfect title at
common law could lead to an ejectment action against the Indian
occupiers. 78 The conveyance and the theoretical possibility of an
ejectment action directly challenged national supremacy in Indian
affairs.79
The Court accepted the argument that Georgia had the right to
dispose of lands within its territory. However, the Court did not
embrace the argument that sovereignty and title of the frontier lands
had passed from Great Britain directly to the States at the time of
the revolution.80 Rather, the Court reaffirmed federal authority and
hinted at the underlying sovereign pre-eminence of the national
government. The Court lessened Georgia’s governmental authority
by disaggregating the legal construct that merged all sovereign
authority and title in the Crown. This concept, if adopted in
Fletcher, would have buttressed the claim that the states were the
pre-eminent receptacles of sovereign authority in the American
federal system. Also, the Court upheld Indian title as an
encumbrance on the land which the state could not extinguish
without federal assistance. Thus, the Indian title actually upheld
federal pre-eminence. As such, the Court, consistent with
PRUCHA, at 43-50 (1962).
4 Albert J. Beveridge, The Life of John Marshall 539 (1919).
77 Fletcher, 10 U.S. at 134.
78 “It was doubted whether a state can be seized in fee of lands, subject to the
Indian title, and whether a decision that they were seized in fee, might not be
construed to amount to a decision that their grantee might maintain an ejectment
for them, notwithstanding that title.” Fletcher, 10 U.S. at 142.
79 WILLIAMS, supra note 68, 65 at 305-307.
80 Id. at 308.
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international law, found that the federal government had both
dominion and sovereignty in an absolute sense.
English legal theory had posited that a “fundamental maxim and
necessary legal principle” of land tenure is “the King is the universal
lord and original proprietor of all in his kingdom” and that “all lands
were originally granted out by the sovereign, and are [the tenures],
therefore, holden, either mediately or immediately of the crown.” 81
American legal theorists adopted the same principle. 82 From this
legal construct, it would follow that an independent sovereign
Georgia, as successor to the Crown, would be the ultimate source of
unencumbered title. Nevertheless, the Fletcher Court, after ruling
that Georgia did indeed have possession and authority to transfer the
land in question, did not hold that Georgia was the source of all land
titles as sovereign.
First, the Court preserved the derivation of title from the British
Crown as to the exterior boundaries of the territory. After a long
recitation of the respective transfers of land under the British Crown,
the Court noted that the Proclamation of 1763 was:

BLACKSTONE, supra, note 23 at 50, 52 n. 6.
It is a fundamental principle in the English law, derived from the maxims of
the feudal tenures, that the king was the original proprietor of all the land in the
kingdom, and the true and only source of title.1 In this country we have adopted
the same principle, and applied it to our republican governments; and it is a
settled and fundamental doctrine with us, that all valid individual title to land,
within the United States, is derived from the grant of our own local
governments, or from that of the United States, or from the crown, or royal,
chartered governments established here prior to the revolution. This was the
doctrine declared, in this state, in the case of Jackson v. Ingraham, and it was
held to be a settled rule, that our courts could not take notice of any title to land
not derived from our own state or colonial government, and duly verified by
patent. Even with respect to the Indian reservation lands, of which they still
retain the occupancy, the fee is supposed to reside in the state, and the validity
of a patent has not hitherto been permitted to be drawn in question, under the
pretext that the Indian right and title, as original lords of the soil, had not been
extinguished. This was assumed to be the law of the land, by the Supreme Court
of this state in Jackson v. Hudson,3 and the same doctrine has been repeatedly
declared by the Supreme Court of the United States.4 The nature of the Indian
title to lands lying within the jurisdiction of a state, though entitled to be
respected by all courts until it be legitimately extinguished, is not such as to be
absolutely repugnant to a seizin in fee on the part of the government within
whose jurisdiction the lands are situated. Such a claim may he consistently
maintained, upon the principle which has been assumed, that the Indian title is
reduced to mere occupancy. JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW,
LECTURE 50 OF THE FOUNDATION OF TITLE TO LAND, available at
https://lonang.com/library/reference/kent-commentaries-american-law/kent-50/
[https://perma.cc/9CHL-Z8XP].
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a temporary arrangement suspending, for a time, the
settlement of the country reserved, and the powers of
the royal governor within the territory reserved but is
not conceived to amount to an alteration of the
boundaries of the colony.83
If the Court had wished to emphasize the limits and the authority of
Georgia as a “sovereign and independent” entity, and recognized as
such by Great Britain in the treaty ending the revolutionary war, this
long recitation would have been unnecessary.84 The Court simply
would have stated that the territory of Georgia was delimited by the
convention between South Carolina and Georgia of April 1787, as
described in the opinion. At that time, prior to the 1789 Constitution,
both would have been sovereign and independent states with the
authority and capacity to determine their own borders by mutual
agreement. While mentioning the convention, the Court did not find
it dispositive of the issue. Instead, the Court, relying on earlier
British acts, clearly insisted that the state of Georgia existed only
within the pre-existing limits of the colony of Georgia, which were
drawn under the sovereign prerogative of the British Crown.
Second, the derivation of title as to the exterior boundaries of
Georgia was paralleled by the continued existence of Indian title,
recognized by and derived from the Crown under the Doctrine of
Discovery, and now held by the federal government. Alienation was
subject to national restrictions. The Court noted that Indian title was
not absolutely repugnant to seisin in fee on the part of the State. 85

Fletcher 10 U.S. at 142.
Id. at 141.
85 The dissent of Justice Johnson suggests the radicalism of the Court’s
reasoning in this regard. “We legislate upon the conduct of strangers or citizens
within their [the Indian tribes] limits, but innumerable treaties formed with them
acknowledge them to be an independent people, and the uniform practice of
acknowledging their right of soil, by purchasing from them, and restraining all
persons from encroaching on their territory, makes it unnecessary to insist upon
their right of soil. Can, then, one nation be said to be seized of a fee-simple in
lands, the right of soil of which is in another nation? It is awkward to apply the
technical idea of fee simple to the interests of a nation, but I must consider an
absolute right of soil as an estate to them and their heirs...In fact, if the Indian
nations be the absolute proprietors of their soil, no other nation can be said to
have the same interest in it.” Johnson went on to argue that the rights of the state
to Indian lands within their boundaries was the right of pre-emption and the
right of conquest which was ceded to the federal government. Id. at 146-47. In
M’Intosh v. Johnson the Court found that such rights never belonged to the
individual states.
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At the same time, the conveyance could not diminish the Indian title.
Notwithstanding the seisin in fee, “Indian title...was certainly to be
respected by all courts, until it was legitimately extinguished.”86 As
the M’Intosh Court noted a decade after Fletcher, Indian title was
not “a right to property and dominion, but a mere right of
occupancy. 87 Nevertheless, the Court’s pronouncement had the
effect of precluding an ejectment action, thereby preserving federal
supervision over the Indians, while maintaining Georgia title. Indian
title was “to be respected by all Courts,” (emphasis added) but
Georgia had no pre-emptive right to extinguish such title. As such,
its title could not be sustained in state or federal courts against the
tribes. Federal supremacy protects Indian title, notwithstanding a
state conveyance. These restrictions were found in the nature of the
constitution.
Georgia cannot be viewed as a single, unconnected,
sovereign power, on whose legislature no other
restrictions are imposed than may be found in its own
constitution. She is a part of a large empire; she is a
member of the American union; and that union has a
constitution the supremacy of which all
acknowledge, and which imposes limits to the
legislatures of the several states, which none claim a
right to pass.88
Moreover, as the federal government was created by all the people
of the several states, it possessed the right and inherited Royal
prerogative which allowed it to encumber Georgia's title. In the end
then, Georgia's conveyance of land in Fletcher, a conveyance that
the legislature of Georgia had the authority to transact concerning
land “within the State of Georgia” and under the jurisdiction of the
state, could not undermine federal authority to determine the final
disposition of land occupied by the tribes. 89 Individual grantees
needed the federal government to extinguish Indian title.

Id. at 154.
“As infidels, heathens, and savages, they were not allowed to possess the
prerogatives belonging to absolute, sovereign and independent nations.” STORY,
supra note 31 at 15 §152.
88 Fletcher, 10 U.S. at 136.
89 Id. at 142.
86
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Finally, the Court refused to find any sovereignty in Georgia’s
assertion of title over its western lands as they became settled. The
Court’s characterization of the land in question left little doubt that
the Lockean civil society – the source of sovereignty -- was to be
found at the national level. Given the argument made by the Plaintiff
concerning the title to the western lands by right of conquest, the
Court had the opportunity to find Georgia’s title in conquest or
recognition of Great Britain but chose not to do so. Under
international law, acquisition of title by conquest is an assertion of
sovereign right or can lead to sovereignty. 90 Rather, the international
law precepts the Court used in Fletcher pointed away from finding
any significance in Georgia’s title. The land claimed and
subsequently conveyed in Fletcher was considered “vacant” by the
Court even though it was assuredly occupied by Indians. This use of
the term “vacant” could not have been used without deliberation.
The seizure and ownership of vacant land, as Georgia’s arms may
have done in the revolutionary war, as opposed to settled or
occupied land, does not bring the title of those lands within the ambit
of sovereign authority. According to Pufendorf, a state or group of
men cannot acquire sovereignty over vacant land by seizing it by
just force.
For since no right inheres in such things [vacant
lands] to prevent any man being able to claim them
for his own ...no special title is needed to secure
dominion over them, but mere physical apprehension
with the intention to keep them for one’s own is
enough. But since men are by nature all equal, and so
no one is subject to another’s authority, it follows
that mere force and seizure are not sufficient to
constitute legitimate sovereignty over men, but that
there is need of some other additional title.
Therefore, when Grotius, Bk. II, Ch. iii, Section 4
lays it down that, ‘Of things which properly belong
to no one, two are capable of seizure, sovereignty and
“But according to the law of nations, not only the person, who makes war
upon just grounds; but any one whatever, engaged in regular and formal war,
becomes absolute proprietor of everything which he takes from the enemy: so
that all nations respect his title, and the title of all, who derive through him their
claim to such possessions.” HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE
335 (A.C. Campbell trans., 1901).
90
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dominion, in so far as the latter is distinguished from
the former”, the word “sovereignty” should not be
taken in its proper sense, and as that which is
exercised over men, but of sovereignty over
territories, the effect of which is that no one should
settle in them against our will, unless he is willing to
become our subject. For otherwise a man is not
included in those things which belong to no one, but
he who is not another’s is his own. 91
In Pufendorf’s terms, it appears that the Court placed sovereignty in
the federal government. Georgia could not claim sovereignty over
all individuals, citizens and non-citizens within its territory. 92
Georgia could claim authority and title over the land, but the Court
found that the authority over individuals – the Indians – lay in the
national government. For Indian title (which implies Indian
occupation and use) is “certainly to be respected by all courts, until
it be legitimately extinguished.” 93 The Court reinforced these
restrictions by also noting that the restrictions of Indian title on fee
simple ownership are due to the Proclamation of 1763, an act of the
sovereign British Crown.
The Court anchored its distinction between title and sovereignty
by extending Lockean logic to the disposition of the lands. As
Jefferson had observed, the nature and purpose of civil institutions
and all land around and within a particular society, “are assumed by
that society and subject to their allotment only.” This may be done
by “themselves, assembled collectively, or by their legislature, [or
their] delegated sovereign authority.” The Fletcher decision
emphasized national authority and involved national sovereignty.
The Court noted that the vacant land issue “within the United States”
was “compromised” among the national government and the states.

5 SAMUEL PUFENDORF, SAMUEL PUFENDORF ON THE LAW OF NATURE AND
NATIONS (O.H. Oldfather & W.A. Oldfather eds., Oceana Publications, Inc
1964) (1688).
92 Chief Justice John Marshall noted that “The jurisdiction of courts is a branch
(emphasis in original) of that which is possessed by the nation as an independent
sovereign power. The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is
necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed
by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an external source,
would imply a diminution of its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction....”
Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. at 136 (1812).
93 Fletcher, 10 U.S. at 142-43.
91
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It was not for the individual states to allot territory in a Lockean
sense – it was for the national government and national civil society.
2. Johnson v. M’Intosh
Johnson v. M’Intosh was an ejectment action brought by
individuals who claimed title to land purchased from the United
Illinois and Wabash Land Companies. The companies in turned
claimed title based on a purchase from Indians in present-day
Indiana and Illinois.94 The issue in M’Intosh was whether a valid
title could be obtained from a tribe by a private purchaser. The Court
found that the tribe could not convey good title because all title in
the United States was grounded in the federal governments’
exclusive pre-emptive right to extinguish Indian title. Chief Justice
Marshall, writing for a unanimous court, grounded this pre-emptive
right as a corollary of the Discovery doctrine, an international law
doctrine that equated “discovery” by European nations with
exclusive title of the discovered land. Marshall recognized how
“extravagant the pretension of converting the discovery of an
inhabited country into conquest may appear” nevertheless held the
title did not depend upon European occupation or conquest for its
validity.95 This “conquest by discovery” thesis wedded sovereign
radical title and the extinguishment of Indian title, aspects of
sovereignty that were incidental to state sovereignty under the
Compact Theory, on the one hand, with international participation
and recognition, characteristics possessed only by the federal
government as successor in interest to the British Crown on the other
hand.
Modifying and elaborating on Fletcher,96 the Court returned to
the concept that all title in America ultimately resided in the
94M’Intosh,

supra note 30. Eric Kades, History and Interpretation of the Great
Case of Johnson v. M'Intosh, 19 L. & HIST. REV. 67 (2001).
95 M’Intosh, 21 U.S at 591.
96 In Fletcher v. Peck, the Court considered the question of whether the “vacant
lands within the United States became joint property, or belonged to the separate
states”. Marshall, C.J. writing for the Court noted that at one time this issue
“threatened to shake the American confederacy to its foundation” held that all
title to all lands conquered or occupied during the War of Independence went to
“the people of the several states.” Chief Justice Marshall noted that “[A]ll the
right and Royal prerogative devolved upon all the people of the several states, to
be exercised in such manner as they should prescribe, and by such governments
as they should erect. The right of dispose of the lands belonging to a state
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sovereign and that this title to land was the direct result of the
sovereign participating in the international system.
While the different nations of Europe respected the
rights of the natives, as occupants, they asserted the
ultimate dominion to be in themselves; and claimed
and exercised, as a consequence of this ultimate
dominion, a power to grant soil, while yet in
possession of the natives. These grants have been
understood by all, to convey a title to the grantees,
subject only to the Indian right of occupancy. 97
The Discovery doctrine, as understood by Marshall, allowed the
European states to claim “[a]n absolute dominion” over lands not
yet occupied by them -- not by virtue of any conquest of, or cession
by, the Indian natives, but as a right acquired by discovery. As such
Indian title was not “a right to property and dominion, but a mere
right of occupancy.”98
All our institutions recognize the absolute title of the
crown, subject only to the Indian right of occupancy,
and recognize the absolute title of the crown to
extinguish that right. This is incompatible with an
absolute and complete title in the Indians. 99
This title was exclusive, and the tribes could dispose of property
only according to the rules of the discoverer state. “An absolute
title to lands cannot exist, at the same time, in different persons, or
in different governments.”100 As the federal government was
successor in interest to the British Crown and held sole preemptive rights to extinguish Indian title, a private purchaser of

naturally devolved upon the legislative body; who were to enact such laws as
should authorize the sale and conveyance of them. Fletcher, 10 U.S. at 121.
97 M’Intosh, 21 U.S. at 574.
98 “As infidels, heathens, and savages, they were not allowed to possess the
prerogatives belonging to absolute, sovereign and independent nations.” STORY,
supra note 31, §152.
99 M’Intosh 21 U.S. at 588.
100 Id. at 587.
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Indian lands held no title.101 In short, despite tribal occupancy and
use of their traditional territories, the tribes held no legal title
recognized under the Discover’s law to their territory
The facts of M’Intosh provided an opportunity for the Court to
acknowledge the pre-existing sovereignty of the states from the
1776 Declaration of Independence because Virginia, which held
title to the land prior to transferring it the federal government, had
rejected the land claim in 1779, 10 years prior to the creation of the
federal government in 1789. If the state and federal governments
were co-benefactors of the British Crown’s sovereign rights under
the Discovery doctrine, if Virginia was a sovereign state under
international law prior to 1789 and thus successor-in-interest of the
British Crown, if national sovereignty was in some sense dependent
on Virginia acceding to the 1789 constitution “as a state,” then land
title to the area would have definitively passed to Virginia (as an
international state) and subsequently to the national government
when Virginia ceded the land to the Confederation Congress in
1784. In such circumstances, the 1779 rejection of the claim by the
Virginia legislature would have conclusively ended the matter.
Marshall, however, argues that Virginia’s sovereignty and
independence from the onset of the Revolutionary War did not have
the quality necessary for Virginia to assume international rights and
obligations. First, he equivocated on the point that the 1783
international treaty ending the War of Independence was an
acknowledgement of individual state, as opposed to national
sovereignty.
By this treaty [that ended the War of Independence],
the powers of government, and the right to soil,
passed definitively to these States. We had before
taken possession of them, by declaring
independence; but neither the declaration of
independence, nor the treaty confirming it, could
give us more than which we before possessed, or to
which Great Brian was entitled. It has never been
doubted, that either the United States, or the several

Moreover, the extinguishment of Indian title by the federal government did
not provide fee simple title to a previous purchaser of land from the Indians; the
federal government could convey land over which it had extinguished Indian
title regardless of the previous purchase.
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states, had clear title to all the lands within the
boundary lines described in the treaty.... 102
If the Court had understood Virginia as possessing both internal
sovereignty and external sovereignty after 1783, it would have been
unnecessary to contrapose the “United States or the several states”,
particularly where Marshall in the earlier Fletcher case rejected the
argument that the territory conquered by American revolutionary
forces during the war was the property of the United States. 103
Second, Marshall questioned Virginia’s power (as opposed to right)
to rescind the title obtained by the original M’Intosh purchasers, a
rather curious observation given Virginia’s assertion of sovereignty
over the area -- unless one assumes that Virginia held only a
subsidiary sovereignty under the British Crown and American
national government. In response to petitions to recognize the
transaction, Virginia had passed legislation in 1779 declaring
Virginia’s exclusive right to purchase Indian land and annulling any
previous purchases by private parties. This 1779 legislation could
have been construed by the Court as voiding the United Illinois and
Wabash Land Companies purchase. However, Marshall did not hold
the 1779 Act dispositive as an exhibition of Virginia’s sovereign
state legislative power; rather he found it to be an additional example
of the practice that colonial governments had historically claimed
exclusive rights to purchase land from the Indians.
Without ascribing to this act the power of annulling
vested rights, or admitting it to countervail the
testimony furnished by the marginal note opposite to
the title of the law, forbidding purchases from the
Indians, in the revivals of the Virginia statutes,
stating that law to be repealed, it may safely be
considered as an unequivocal affirmance, on the part
of Virginia, of the broad principle which had always
been maintained, that the exclusive right to purchase
from the Indians resided in the government. 104

M’Intosh, 21 U.S. at 584-85 (Emphasis added).
Fletcher, 10 U.S. at 142.
104 Id. at 585.
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Instead, the Court reached back toward the idea that only one
international sovereign can be the source of all title. It grounded
that title on the right of self-preservation and conquest, legal rights
only within the provenance of an international sovereign. In doing
so, it excluded the states as a locus of complete sovereignty.
Marshall’s nationalist perspective lies in his finding that Indian
sovereignty was immediately diminished by European discovery (as
an extension of state- sanctioned or affirmed exploration) and tribes
or individual Indians had no natural right to the lands they occupied.
That the Discovery doctrine necessarily diminishes Indian title or
that the “[c]onquest gives title which the Courts of the conqueror
cannot deny” was not new. 105 However, by articulating the
“conquest by discovery” thesis, the M’Intosh Court forcefully
asserted that the tribes had neither international rights nor natural or
positive rights save what the European conquers granted them or
what they maintained for themselves by force. This was contrary to
recognized international practice, but the Court noted: “The law
which regulates, and ought to regulate in general, the relations
between the conqueror and the conquered, was incapable of
application to a people under such circumstances.” 106 Thus even if
tribes wished to recognize and sell individual property, thereby
enabling them to improve and cultivate the land and exercise their
natural law right to property, they could not. Likewise, a grant of
individual property could not “separate the Indian from his nation,
nor give a title which our Courts could distinguish from the title of
his tribe....” unless the sale was recognized in a treaty.107 The Court,
emphasizing the legal effects of the Discovery doctrine,

Id. at 588. Vattel, for example, wrote: “Their [the Indians] unsettled
habitation in those immense regions cannot be accounted a true and legal
possession; and the people of Europe, too closely pent up at home, finding land
of which the savages stood in no particular need, and of which they made no
actual and constant use, were lawfully entitled to take possession of it and settle
it with colonies. The earth, as we have already observed, belongs to mankind in
general, and was designed to furnish them with subsistence; if each nation had,
from the beginning, resolved to appropriate to itself a vast country, that the
people might live only by hunting, fishing, and wild fruits, our globe would not
be sufficient to maintain a tenth part of its present inhabitants. We do not
therefore, deviate from the views of nature, in confining the Indians within
narrower limits.” E. VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, §209 (Chitty Ed., 1883);
See also L.C. Green, Claims to Territory in Colonial America, in THE LAW OF
NATIONS AND THE NEW WORLD (The Univ. of Alberta Press, 1989).
106 M’Intosh, 21 U.S. at 596.
107Id. at 593.
105
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characterized the tribes as dependent nations regardless of their
actual dependence or independence in fact. 108
Without a natural right to their lands or sovereignty, the tribes
would need to claim various rights under positive international law
as sovereign, independent people or derive whatever rights they had
from the municipal law of the sovereign. The Discovery doctrine
presumptively eliminated any rights under international law, but
Marshall nevertheless understood the doctrine as incorporating legal
rights to occupancy into the municipal legal system based on the
tribes’ formerly independent and sovereign status.
In the establishment of these relations, the rights of the
original inhabitants were, in no instance, entirely disregarded;
but were necessarily, to a considerable extent, impaired. They
were admitted to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a
legal as well as just claim to retain possession of it, and to use
it according to their own discretion; but their rights to
complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were
necessarily diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil
at their own will, to whomsoever they pleased, was denied by
the original fundamental principle, that discovery gave
exclusive title to those who made it. 109
These rights were necessarily incorporated into federal law because
it was the sole successor-in-interest to the British Crown and held
radical title to all lands over which Indian title had not been
extinguished.
Actual relations with the Indians reinforced the national
character of the Indian rights based on the international status of the
federal government and the former pre-discovery status of the tribes.
According to the Court, the peculiar relationship between the
British/Americans and the Indians was similar to, but differed in
many respects, from the political relations among foreign nations.
Practices similar to international intercourse, such as diplomatic
exchanges and entering into treaties with tribes, were carried out
because the tribes were “yet too powerful and brave not to be
dreaded as formidable enemies.” 110 The reasons for this were not

Id. at 597.
Id. at 574.
110 Id. at 596.
108
109
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principled but practical. The Indians were “fierce savages” who
could not be “safely governed as a distinct people” until the
“conquest is complete.”111 Hence:
Indian inhabitants are to be considered merely as
occupants...However this restriction may be opposed
to natural right, and to the usages of civilized nations,
yet, if it be indispensable to that system under which
the country has been settled, and be adapted to the
actual condition of the two people, it may, perhaps,
be supported by reason, and certainly cannot be
rejected by Courts of justice.112
Under the circumstances where assertions of dominium are: 1)
legally efficacious; and 2) pretensions to be realized only through
cession, acquiesce or conquest of the tribes; or 3) the results of actual
conquest by military force, the Discovery doctrine ultimately
resolves itself into an issue of the United States’ right of selfpreservation and right of conquest.
We will not enter into the controversy, whether
agriculturists, merchants, and manufacturers, have a
right, on abstract principles, to expel hunters from the
territory they possess, or to contract their limits.
Conquest gives a title which the Courts of the
conqueror cannot deny, whatever the private and
speculative opinions of individuals may be,
respecting the original justice of the claim which has
been successfully asserted. The British government,
which was then our government, and whose rights
have passed to the United States, asserted a title to all
the lands occupied by Indians, within the chartered
limits of the British colonies. It asserted also a
limited sovereignty over them, and the exclusive
right of extinguishing the title which occupancy gave
to them. These claims have been maintained and

111
112

Id. at 587-88.
Id. at 591-92.
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established as far west as the river Mississippi, by the
sword.113
The states are incompetent in this regard. Discovery and the claim
of absolute dominium is an assertion of power “now possessed by
the government of the United States, to grant lands, [and it] resided,
while we were colonies, in the crown or its grantees.” The predations
of the tribes threatened the security of the crown and its grantees.
Self-preservation is a natural right of the sovereign. The United
States has both the right and duty to defend itself as a sovereign
entity. As Pufendorf pointed out, “The general rule for the conduct
of supreme sovereigns is: Let the safety of the people be the supreme
law…For sovereignty is conferred upon them with the intention that
through it there may be secured the end for which states are
established.”114
This natural right of the federal government to defend its citizens
and the corresponding denial of any natural right of the tribes is
mirrored by the Court’s denial of a state’s natural right of
sovereignty under Lockean principles. The Court refused to find
natural or positive rights in the Lockean claim to state sovereignty –
a presumption which underlay the Compact Theory. 115 It would not
Id. at 588.
PUFENDORF, supra note 91 at 18-19.
115 The states generally did not justify their occupation and possession of lands
was not based on positive international law or as successors-in-interest to the
prerogatives of the British Crown. Rather they based their claims on a Lockean
conception of society and property. Locke argued things in nature that were
removed from their natural state by human labor became that individual’s
property. For those whose settled the frontier, Locke stated that “he who
appropriates land to himself by his labor, does not lessen but increases the
common stock of mankind.” John Locke, Two Treatise of Government in Man
and the State: The Political Philosophers 336 (Saxe Commines & Robert N.
Linscott eds., 1963); The resultant formula held that individuals and their
sovereign states had both the right and duty to possess and develop the wild and
vacant lands held by the Indians. Thomas Jefferson stated this thesis in “A
Summary View of the Rights of British America” in 1774: “The fictitious
principle that all lands belong originally to the king, they [the colonists] were
early persuaded to believe real, and accordingly took grants of their own from
the crown....It is time therefore for us to lay this matter before his majesty, and
to declare that he has no right to grant lands of himself. From the nature and
purpose of civil institutions, all the lands within the limits which any particular
society has circumscribed around itself, are assumed by that society and subject
to their allotment only. This may be done by themselves, assembled collectively,
or by their legislature, to whom they may have delegated sovereign authority:
and, if they are allotted in neither of these ways, each individual of the society
113
114
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speculate “whether agriculturalist, merchants, and manufacturers,
have a right, on abstract principles, to expel hunters from the
territory they possess, or to contract their limits.” 116 Rather the title
of lands and ultimate dominion is acquired and maintained by force.
This is not to say that the Court did not ascribe to a Lockean view
of political society. Instead, the society it focused on was decidedly
national. Marshall noted this when he acknowledged the incongruity
between natural law and the position advanced by the Court:
As the right of society, to prescribe those rules by
which property may be acquired and preserved is not,
and cannot be drawn into question; as the title to
lands, especially, is and must be admitted to depend
entirely on the law of the nation in which they lie; it
will be necessary, in pursuing this inquiry, to
examine, not singly those principles of abstract
justice, which the Creator of all things has impressed
on the mind of his creature man, and which are
admitted to regulate, in a great degree, the rights of
civilized nations, whose perfect independence is
acknowledged; but those principles also which our
own government has adopted in a particular case, and
given us as the rule of our decision. 117
The national character of Locke’s political society is further
elaborated by the Court when it asserts “Conquest gives title that the
Courts of the conqueror cannot deny.”118 The Court is national; the
conquest is national. The right of conquest—and conquest by force
of law under the Discovery doctrine—is held only by the absolute
sovereign under international law.
The national focus is further evidenced by the different
characterizations of Indian lands given by the Court in M’Intosh and
the earlier Fletcher case. Marshall writing for the Fletcher majority
may appropriate to himself such lands as he finds vacant, and occupancy will
give him title.” Thomas Jefferson, The Portable Thomas Jefferson 18-19
(Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1985); For a discussion of the Lockean argument used
by the states, see ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN
WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST 287317 (1990).
116 M’Intosh, 21 U.S. at 587.
117 Id. at 572.
118 Id. at 588.
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described the Indian lands subject to the dispute as “vacant”; a
characterization seemingly disputed by Justice Johnson’s dissent. In
Fletcher, Johnson had argued that the tribes in the disputed area
“retain a limited sovereignty, and the absolute proprietorship of their
soil.” 119 As vacant land, the Crown would have assumed
sovereignty and title. From this nationalist perspective, the
contentious issue that existed between the Federal government and
Georgia, the issue of who held sovereignty or radical title, or the
nature of Indian title, simply disappears. The only question for the
Court was whether the Georgia legislature could convey the land.
The M’Intosh Court characterized the Indian land and the assertion
of sovereignty by the Crown under the legal pretext of discovery
quite differently.120
Thus, the colonies were an extension of the sovereign authority
of the Crown, and the territory “discovered” was already part of the
nation that discovered it. Discovery occurs and possession is taken
prior to actual occupation under the authority of an existing imperial
government. Yet the territory over which sovereignty was asserted
in M’Intosh was not deemed vacant or terra nullius. It was occupied
by tribes, who the Court admitted, were “rightful occupants of the
soil” and who were “in fact independent.” 121 Marshall describes
them as “fierce savages,” whose occupation was war and who “were
as brave and as high spirited as they were fierce, and were ready to
repel by arms every attempt on their independence.”122 Given this
characterization from an international law perspective, the conquest
of such peoples, either by force or by law, is an affirmation of
sovereignty. Where force is necessary, it is the prerogative of the
national sovereign government. For the right to use force, according
to Vattel, “or to make war, is given to Nations only for their defense
and for the maintenance of their rights....”123 This right to wage just
war is the sole prerogative of sovereigns and “[w]ar in a just cause

Johnson concludes: “What, then, practically, is the interest of the states in the
soil of the Indians within their boundaries? Unaffected by particular treaties, it
is nothing more than what was assumed at the first settlement of the country, to
wit, a right of conquest or of purchase, exclusively of all competitors within
certain defined limits.” This right could not be conveyed by Georgia legislature.
Fletcher at 10 U.S. 102- 103.
120 See also LINDLEY, supra note 52, at 114.
121M’Intosh, 21 U.S. at 574, 586.
122 Id. at 590.
123 VATTEL, supra note 33, at 243.
119
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is therefore, according to the natural law...a natural mode of
acquiring title.”124
3. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia
M’Intosh held that the exclusive power of extinguishing Indian
title allowed the federal government to enter into treaties or go to
war to clear the land for settlement. This power descended from
Great Britain and was established by the M’Intosh Court to be part
of the natural right to self-preservation and just war. Yet the rights
under natural and international law (and established by British
practice) that would have normally been accorded a conquered
people were not available to the tribes. After M’Intosh, the legal
nature of Indian tribes and how these entities would enter into the
American legal system became increasingly important as the tribes
sought to use the courts to defend themselves in the face of increased
settlement and declining military power.
One means of securing rights “within” the American legal
system was by treaty yet the notion that treaties would be used to
incorporate the tribes into the American federal system brought a
new set of issues. A treaty under the Supremacy Clause of the 1789
Constitution led to an assertion of federal authority in areas that may
be reserved for the states. This had been a longstanding objection to
the constitution, and the extension of federal power faced increased
political opposition from the states. 125 There also remained the issue
of how the pre-existing sovereignty and independence of the tribes
would be incorporated into the federal system. The Compact Theory
and the National Supremacy Theory both assumed that the
sovereignty of the people of the United States was singular and
unitary; that is the sovereign people delegated various powers to
their chosen units of government.
Recognition of Indian
sovereignty and independence within the internal boundaries of the
United States, but outside of the categories established by American
Id. at 307.
“And the senate has moreover, various and great executive powers, viz., in
concurrence with the president-general, they form treaties with foreign nations,
that may control and abrogate the constitutions and laws of the several states.
Indeed, there is no power, privilege or liberty of the state governments, or of the
people, but what may be affected by virtue of this power.” The Address and
reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the convention of Pennsylvania to their
Constituents, December 18, 1787 in The Anti-Federalist Papers and the
Constitutional Convention Debates 251 (Ralph Ketcham, ed. (1986).
124
125
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political theory, the constitution, and international law, threatened
the underlying assumption of complete internal sovereignty of the
American people and the external sovereignty of the United States.
As Justice Johnson noted in his concurrence in Cherokee Nation:
We had then just emerged ourselves from a situation
having much stronger claims than the Indians for
admission into the family of nations; and yet we were
not admitted, until we had declared ourselves no
longer provinces, but states, and showed some
earnestness and capacity in asserting our claim to be
enfranchised. Can it be supposed, that when using
those terms [“foreign” and “state” as found in the
constitution], we meant to include any others than
those who were admitted into the community of
nations, of whom, most notoriously, the Indians were
no part?126
For the Court that espoused the pre-eminent version of the federal
government, the recognition of Indian sovereignty and
independence within the borders of the United States brought
additional problems. For example, if Indian sovereignty (even if
only a residual of pre-existing sovereignty and independence prior
to conquest and discovery) was accorded recognition by the courts,
it would add force to the argument that each states’ pre-existing
internal sovereignty and external sovereignty was in some sense a
check on federal sovereignty. As Justice Johnson pointed out above,
the states had “much stronger claims...for admission to the family of
nations....”
The Court resolved these issues in Cherokee Nation, which
concerned the right of the Cherokee Tribe, pursuant to a treaty with
the federal government, to directly enforce its treaty rights in federal
court. The Cherokee commenced an original action for an injunction
in the United States Supreme Court to prevent Georgia from
extending its jurisdiction over a reservation established by a federal
treaty. The laws of Georgia, the Cherokee alleged, “go directly to
annihilate the Cherokees as a political society and to seize...the lands
of the nation which have been assured them by the United States

126

Cherokee Nation v. The State of Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 26 (1831).
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Government, in solemn treaties repeatedly made and still in
force.”127
The Court began its analysis by admitting that the Cherokee
were a “distinct and independent society.”
So much of the argument as was intended to prove
the character of the Cherokees as a state, as a distinct
political society, separated from others, capable of
managing its own affairs and governing itself, has, in
the opinion of a majority of judges, been completely
successful. They have been uniformly treated as a
state, from the settlement of our country. 128
Yet, for the majority of the judges, the existence of an independent
Cherokee nation was not enough. For purposes of Article III of the
1789 Constitution, the Court concluded that Indian tribes were not
“foreign states” and the Court therefore did not have jurisdiction. 129
Building on the distinction between sovereignty and independence
he delineated in Johnson, Justice Marshall commented that foreign
nations are generally “nations not owing a common allegiance” to
each other. However, “[i]ndian territory is admitted to compose a
part of the United States:”
In all the Cherokee dealings with the United States
they are considered within the jurisdictional limits of
the United States. Moreover, they acknowledge
themselves, in their treaties, to be under the
protection of the United States, [and] they admit that
the United States shall have the sole and exclusive
right of regulating trade with them and managing
their affairs as they think proper....130

127Id.

at 14.
Id. Of the five Justices who participated in the case three (Marshall,
Thompson, Story, JJ) recognized the Cherokee as a “state.” Marshall did not
find them to be a foreign state for purposes of Article III. Johnson and Baldwin,
JJ did not recognize the Cherokee as a state.
129 “The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or
which shall be made...and between a State, or Citizens thereof, and foreign
States, Citizens, or Subjects.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
130 Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 15.
128
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Rather than deeming the Cherokee an independent foreign state, the
majority held that the Cherokee and other tribes are “domestic
dependent nations [that] are in a state of pupilage; [and] their
relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his
guardian.”131
Given that the M’Intosh Court emphasized that conquest and
war were the currency of American-Indian relations, the use of the
ward-guardian relationship is curious. Analogizing the wardguardian relationship to aboriginal people had circulated for some
time, and it was ascribed to in other colonial jurisdictions, but it was
not widely accepted at the time. 132 Nevertheless, the use of the
concept in the treaty context suggests incorporation of the tribes
into the American legal system under the authority and protection of
the federal government. While under this ward-guardian
relationship, the ward tribe has no rights save those asserted or
recognized by the federal government, it is nevertheless presumed
that
there are a set of legally protected interests held the protected
party.
It is also curious that even from its nationalistic perspective, the
Court found that Indian “nations” were competent to make a treaty
or contract without recognizing the corresponding right to enforce
the contract in federal court. For the Court, Indian relations
remained essentially issues of war and peace, or federal domination.
In international law, the Indian tribes were conquered people who

Id. at 27.
Vitoria stated that there may be instances where “It might therefore be
maintained that in their own interests [the Indians] the sovereigns of Spain might
undertake the administration of their country...so long as this was clearly for
their benefit.” He doubted however that the idea would not be abused. Francisco
de Vitoria, De Indis et De Ivre Belli Relectiones, in THE CLASSICS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 160-161 §18 (Ernest Nys ed., James Brown Scott ed.,
John Pawley Bate trans., Oceana Publ’ns, Inc., 1964); It is said that Edmund
Burke first formulated the duties of a colonial power in terms of trusteeship in a
speech in the House of Commons on Fox’s India Bill of 1783. “All political
power which is set over men...ought in some way or other exercised ultimately
for their benefit. If this is true with regard to every species of political dominion,
and every description of commercial privilege, none of which can be original
self-derived rights, or grants for the mere private benefit of the holders, then
such rights or privileges, or whatever else you chuse (sic) to call them, are all, in
the strictest sense, a trust; and it is of the very essence of every trust to be
rendered accountable: and even totally to cease, when it substantially varies
from the purposes for which alone it could have a lawful existence.” LINDLEY,
supra note 52, at 330.
131
132
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had, despite the Court’s rhetoric, ceased to be a states.133 Prior to
their elimination as independent states however, the “habits and
usages” of Indian relations were essentially a government-togovernment policy matter which did not include a consideration of
the respective rights by the federal courts. The Court noted:
At the time the constitution was framed, the idea of
appealing to an American court of justice for an
assertion of right or redress of wrong, had perhaps
never entered the mind of an Indian or of his tribe.
Their appeal was to the tomahawk, or to the
government. This was well understood by the
statesmen who framed the constitution.... 134
Thus, the Cherokee Nation Court, by refusing jurisdiction, was
simply emphasizing the international status that had once existed
with the tribes and their now conquered status. The residual nature
of the relationship precluded both the Court and the states from
interfering with the policy of the federal government political
branches.
It has been argued that the decision in Cherokee Nation avoided
a political crisis between the Court and federal government, on the
one hand, and the Jackson Administration and the states on the
other.135 However, in avoiding a political crisis, the Court reasserted
federal authority in three ways.
First, Marshall limited the reach of the Eleventh amendment to
its terms in the case. 136 Georgia, claiming sovereign immunity, had
“But a people, that has passes under the domination of another, can no longer
form a state, and in direct manner make use of the law of nations. Such were the
people and kingdoms which the Romans rendered subject to their empire; the
most, even of those whom they had honored with the name of friends and allies,
no longer formed states. Within themselves they were governed by their own
laws and magistrates; but without, they were in everything obliged to follow the
orders of Rome; they dared not of themselves make either war or an alliance,
and could not treat with nations.” Emmerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations or
Principles of the Law of Nature Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations
and Sovereigns 18, § 11 (Dublin, Ireland: Luke White,1792).
134 Id. at 17.
135 See Joseph C. Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics, and
Morality, 21 STAN. L. REV. 500, 514-16 (1969).
136 The Eleventh Amendment states: “The Judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by
Citizens or Subjects of any foreign State.” U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
133
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refused to answer or accept the jurisdiction of the Court in the case.
Marshall cited Article III, Section 2 of the constitution, and stated
that “the party defendant [Georgia] may unquestionably be sued in
this court.” In so holding, Marshall indicated that the Eleventh
Amendment did not grant Georgia or any state a general defense of
sovereign immunity. He asserted federal jurisdiction over states in
those areas beyond the terms of the amendment, a broad
interpretation in an era of increasingly strident assertions of state
authority.
Second, Marshall set the groundwork for the federal preemption of all state authority over tribes under the Indian Commerce
Clause. The Cherokee argued that the commerce clause intended “to
give the whole power of managing” Indian affairs to the federal
government, thus “removing those doubts in which the management
of Indian affairs” that had prevailed under the Articles of
Confederation. 137 Marshall agreed to the exclusive constitutional
grant of authority to the federal government, even though his
reasoning did not confer jurisdiction.
Had the Indian tribes been foreign nations, in the
view of the convention; this exclusive authority of
regulating intercourse with them might have been,
and, most probably, would have been, specifically
given, in language indicating that idea, not in
language contradistinguishing them from foreign
nation.138
This broad grant of legislative power, excluding or precluding state
jurisdiction, recapitulated McCulloch while going beyond the
justification for federal authority under the dormant commerce
clause outlined in Gibbons v. Ogden.139
Third, the Court avoided a political crisis by reasserting the
position that certain disputes concerning external sovereignty and
international law—recognition of foreign states, when a state of war
exists, or how to dispose of confiscated property during hostilities—
are questions of “policy” rather than of “law” and continue to

Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 19.
Id. (emphasis added).
139 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1984).
137
138

198

reserve these issues for the federal government.140 The judiciary had
the duty “to decide upon individual rights, according to those
principles which political departments of the nation have
established.” It did not have jurisdiction to decide those great issues
involving a sovereign in its external relations. 141 From this
perspective, the federal government retained absolute internal and
external sovereignty. The issue of whether Indian treaties were
enforceable obligations depended upon the federal political
departments.142 The authority, however, including the authority to
pre-empt and override state jurisdiction, remained in the federal
government as a whole. 143 The sovereign always retained the
authority to disregard a treaty and face whatever internal or
international disapprobation that might arise.
4. Worcester v. Georgia
It is ironic that the Court cited the “former” sovereignty of the
tribes to justify continued and permanent domination of them by the
federal government in Cherokee Nation. The tribes’ “diminished”
sovereignty had its roots in international law and was the
consequence of the Discovery doctrine set forth in M’Intosh. In
Worcester v. Georgia, the Court extended this notion and asserted
the pre-existing and pre-eminent sovereignty of the national
government by virtue of its international relations with the tribes.144
At the same time, it denied the pre-existing sovereignty of the states
and their incapacity to act in the international sphere as did the
tribes.145

Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. 110, 128-29 (1814); see also Schooner
Exch., 11 U.S. at 135.
141 Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 415, 433 (1829).
142 Chief Justice John Marshall noted that “The jurisdiction of courts is a branch
(emphasis in original) of that which is possessed by the nation as an independent
sovereign power. The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is
necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed
by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an external source,
would imply a diminution of its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction....”
Schooner Exch., 11 U.S. at 136.
143 For a further discussion of the Law-Politics distinction as Marshall
understood the term, see William E. Nelson, The Eighteenth-Century
Background of John Marshall's Constitutional Jurisprudence, 76 MICH. L. REV.
893, 944-953 (1978).
144 Worcester, 31 U.S. at 515.
145 Id.
140
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M’Intosh, Cherokee Nation, and Fletcher were used by the
individual states to extend their jurisdiction to individual Indians,
tribes and Indian country. 146 They argued that the effect of the
Discovery doctrine as outlined in M’Intosh, and the idea that the
Indian title was not incompatible with state possession of the land in
Fletcher, precluded the tribes from exercising full sovereignty over
their territory and their members while providing them with only a
permissive occupancy of their lands. 147 This occupancy, which
provided for a nomadic non-agricultural lifestyle, could not interfere
with the advance of the frontier. Moreover, the extension of state
jurisdiction and termination of the permissive use was a matter of
policy and was not reviewable by courts.148 Federal efforts, either
by treaty or through the commerce power to protect Indians and
prevent the extension of state jurisdiction were unconstitutional
because they impermissibly trenched on state sovereignty.
No state was more assertive in this regard than Georgia. Georgia
had ceded its western territory (which subsequently became
Alabama and Mississippi) in 1802 to the United States with the
understanding that the federal government would extinguish Indian
title within its remaining borders as quickly as possible. After gold
was discovered in territory reserved to the Cherokee by treaty,
Georgia had passed a series of laws assuming jurisdiction over

See Caldwell v. The State, 1 Ala. 327 (1832), where Saffold, J. of the
Alabama Supreme Court noted: “The circumstance of the United States having
the ultimate right of soil, cannot impair the right of sovereignty. There is no
incongruity in the proposition that the right to the public domain resides in the
United States, while the ordinary right of empire, over the same territory, is
vested in the state government. Such is, and has been, the condition of most or
all the new states. While the United States have possessed and exercised the
right to dispose of the unappropriated lands, and even to remove intruders from
them, the states, containing them, have, as uniformly, exercised the ordinary
municipal government.”
147 “The majority of the court is of opinion that the nature of the Indian title,
which is certainly to be respected by all courts, until it be legitimately
extinguished, is not such as to be absolutely repugnant to seisin in fee on the part
of the state.” Fletcher, 10 U.S. at 142-43.
148 In Cherokee Nation, Marshall stated “That part of the bill which respects the
land occupied by the Indians, and prays the aid of the court to protect their
possession, may be more doubtful. The mere question of right might perhaps be
decided by this court in a proper case with proper parties. But the court is asked
to do more than decide on the title. The bill requires us to control the legislature
of Georgia, and to restrain the exertion of its physical force. The propriety of
such an interposition by the court may be well questioned. It savours too much
of the exercise of political power to be within the proper province of the judicial
department.” Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 39.
146
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Cherokee country after efforts to move them west by mutual
agreement had failed.
Worcester involved the arrest and conviction by Georgia of a
U.S. citizen who had entered Cherokee country to proselytize under
a federal law but contrary to Georgia law. The Court reversed the
conviction stating that: “the whole power of regulating the
intercourse with [the Indians] is vested in the United States” and
Georgia had no jurisdiction over the Cherokee territory established
by federal treaty. 149 Historically, the Court noted, the power of
regulating the relationship with the Indians did not extend to the
regulation of their internal affairs. Marshall noted, “He [the king]
...never intruded into the interior of their affairs or interfered with
their self-government so far as respected themselves only.” 150 This
condition was guaranteed by treaties, first with the British Crown
and later with the United States. As the Cherokee nation is
recognized by treaty as a separate independent entity, state authority
within Indian country is “extra-territorial” and ultra vires.
The Cherokee nation, then, is distinct occupying its
own territory, with boundaries accurately described,
in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, in
which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter,
but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves, or
in conformity with the treaties and with the acts of
Congress. The whole intercourse between the
United States and this nation, is, by our constitution
and laws, vested in the government of the United
States.151
The decision in Worcester was not enforced. Either President
Jackson refused to enforce the ruling or deficiencies in federal law
made enforcement impracticable. 152
Marshall grounded the opinion in Worcester on international law
and concepts of federal supremacy arguing that the establishment of
Worcester, 31 U.S. at 501.
“[O]ur history furnishes no example, from the first settlement of our country,
of any attempt on the part of the crown to interfere with the internal affairs of
the Indians, farther than to keep out the agents of foreign powers, who, as
traders or otherwise, who might seduce them into foreign alliances.” Id. at 496.
151 Id. at 561.
152 Joseph C. Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics, and
Morality, 21 STAN. L. REV. 500, 525 (1969).
149
150
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the United States through the 1783 Treaty ending the Revolutionary
War did not include full recognition of internal and external
sovereignty in each of the states while full sovereignty passed to the
national American government. Echoing McCulloch and the
commerce power case Gibbons v. Ogden, the Court argued that the
change from the Articles of Confederation to the 1789 Constitution
fundamentally altered the relationship between the states and the
federal government. 153 Marshall opined again that the 1789
constitution provided that federal authority was supreme within the
sphere of its enumerated powers: 154
That instrument [the U.S. Constitution] confers on
congress the powers of war and peace: of making
treaties, and of regulating commerce with foreign
nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian tribes. These powers comprehend all that is
required for the regulation of our intercourse with the
Indians. They are not limited by any restrictions on
their free action. The shackles imposed on this
power, in the confederation, are discarded. 155
The fundamental pre-eminence of the federal government under the
1789 constitution was not the sole factor in the Court’s decision.
The Court, as it did in M’Intosh and Cherokee Nation, firmly
grounded the tribes within the ambit of international law
recognizing the previous sovereignty of the tribes and their
exclusive intercourse with the Federal government.
Marshall argued that the Discovery Doctrine did not provide the
states with sovereignty over the tribes because diminished tribal
sovereignty remained while ultimate radical title vested in the
federal government. The states could not extend their sovereign and
jurisdiction over the tribes because the basis of their sovereignty was
exclusively territorial.
As mentioned above international law theorists posited that the
sovereignty of a state consisted of two parts, internal sovereignty
Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 1.
Charles F. Hobson argues that the principle significance of Gibbons lay “not
so much in building up and centralizing federal power as in circumscribing state
power.” CHARLES F. HOBSON, THE GREAT CHIEF JUSTICE: JOHN MARSHALL
AND THE RULE OF LAW 138-149 (1996).
155 Worcester, 31 U.S. at 500.
153
154
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and external sovereignty. Internal sovereignty is the “right of
control” which is inherent in the people of any state, or vested in
its ruler, by the constitution or by municipal law.
The sovereign state had both the right and duty to preserve its
existence and expect the obedience of individuals who lived within
its border to abide by its rules. This control over individuals and the
authority to make binding law, was the primary paramount
difference between a sovereign and non-sovereign state.156
From this perspective, the Discovery doctrine does not provide
the discovering nation with sovereignty over the tribes. The
Discovery doctrine, Marshall wrote:
[R]egulated the right given by discovery among the
European discoverers but could not affect the rights
of those already in possession, either as aboriginal
occupants, or as occupants by virtue of a discovery
made before the memory of man. It gave the
exclusive right to purchase but did not found that
right on a denial of the right of the possessor to
sell.157
This diminished international sovereignty preserves the right of selfgovernment to the tribes and provides the federal government with
the exclusive right (as international sovereign) to incorporate the
tribes into the American federal system or the internal sovereignty
of the United States. The incorporation was either through tribal
agreement by way of treaty, by which a tribe does not lose its
residual sovereignty, or by conquest.
This tribal sovereignty is contrasted to the sovereignty of the
individual states. The Court found that the practices of European
nations and the United States treated the tribes as international
sovereigns.
The words “treaty” and “nation” are words of our
own language, selected in our diplomatic and
legislative proceedings, by ourselves, having each a
definite and well understood meaning. We have

4 Samuel Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae et Gentium Libri Octo in THE
CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 585 (1964).
157 Worcester, 31 U.S. at 495.
156
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applied them to Indians, as we have applied them to
the other nations of the earth.158
These practices, as set forth in British foreign policy documents and
American treaties, treated the Indians as equals under international
law. For the most part, the tribes, as was generally acknowledged
and required by international practices, had voluntarily agreed to
enter into treaties ceding territory. Thus, in the Worcester Court’s
opinion, the tribes had some external sovereignty at least at the time
they signed the treaties regardless of whether their land lay within
the external borders of the United States. The diminished
sovereignty of the tribes due to the operation of the Discovery
doctrine is irrelevant in this analysis as the capacity of the tribes to
wage war (as allies or enemies) conferred on them an international
though dependent status. The relationship then created by treaties is
delimited by and grounded in international law. The Court stated
(quoting Vattel) “[t]ributary and feudatory states do not thereby
cease to be sovereign and independent states, so long as selfgovernment and sovereign and independent authority are left in the
administration of the state.”159
Further while the tribes were recognized as independent and
sovereign nations under international law, i.e. having external
sovereignty, their characteristics also suggested they had internal
sovereignty. The tribes had territory with clearly delineated borders
within which they asserted exclusive authority to enforce their own
law. Within this territory they had both the right and practice of selfgovernment. In addition, the tribes had agreed to certain codes of
conduct regarding non-citizens within their territory and demanded
different treatment for their citizens from the federal government.
Finally, the tribes had the ultimate sovereign right of war and peace,
a right recognized to inhere only in international sovereigns.
In contrast, the colonies as described in Worcester were found
to have no external or internal sovereignty—ultimate authority and
title was asserted by the British Crown under the Discovery
doctrine. This title granted proprietorship to Great Britain and the
colonies as grantees of the Crown but had no impact on the
independence of the tribes. Marshall wrote, “these grants asserted a
title against Europeans only, and were considered a blank paper so
158
159

Id. at 500-501.
Id. at 501.
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far as the rights of the natives were concerned.” 160 Unlike the tribes,
the boundaries of the colonies were set by the Crown. Moreover, the
Crown could modify the rights of individuals within those
boundaries such as it did by the Royal Proclamation of 1763. 161
Crucially from an international law perspective, the power of
making offensive and defensive war, the ultimate prerogative of the
international sovereign was not given the colonies by the Crown.
“The power of making war is conferred by these charters on the
colonies, [but] defensive war alone seems to have been
contemplated.”162
It is the sovereign power alone...which has the right
to make war...War is either defensive or offensive.
The purpose of defensive war is simple, namely selfdefense; the purpose of offensive war varies
according to the different interest of nations, but in
general it relates to the enforcement of certain rights
or to their protection. A sovereign attack a nation,
either to obtain something which he lays claim or to
punish the nation for an injury he has received from
it or to forestall and an injury it which is about to
inflict upon him.... 163
The inability to wage offensive and defensive war, according to
international law, would prevent the colonies from acquiring
dominion and sovereignty over the Indians by right of conquest or
as grantees of the crown. All the success of their arms would
redoubt to the benefit of the British sovereign. 164
Under the Compact Theory and the Doctrine of the Landed
States, the assertion of independence by the united colonies and the
states should have changed their previous dependence upon the

Id. at 497.
Id. at 496.
162 Id. at 545 (emphasis in original) (The court found that the Crown conferred
the power of defensive and offensive was but “only on just cause” on the colony
of Rhode Island).
163 See VATTEL, supra note 33, at 235-36.
164 See GROTIUS, supra note 55, at 335. “But according to the law of nations, not
only the person, who makes war upon just grounds; but any one whatsoever,
engaged in regular and formal war, becomes absolute proprietor of everything
which he takes from the enemy: so that all nations respect his title, and title of
all, who derive through him their claim to such possessions.”
160
161
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Crown. However, the Worcester Court does not understand the
revolution to have changed the non-sovereign status of each colony.
According to the Compact Theory, each state became a sovereign
independent nation within the society of nations at the time they
declared independence. Instead, the Worcester Court emphasized
the “sovereign” role of the Confederation Government and
Continental Congress prior to the 1789 constitution. From this
perspective, the international affairs aspect of Native American
relations is crucial evidence of the pre-eminence of the national
government. The relations of war and peace and international
relations in general, the Court stated, were recognized by all the
colonies as residing in the Crown. As the revolution commenced,
the colonies sent delegates to the Continental Congress and later to
the Confederation Congress.
Congress, therefore, was considered as invested with
all the power of war and peace, and congress
dissolved our connection with the mother country
and declared these United Colonies to be
independent states. Congress employed diplomatic
agents, negotiated treaties and signed treaties.165
Moreover, “from the same necessity and on the same principles,
Congress assumed the management of Indian affairs in the name of
the colonies and later for the Confederation.” Attempts were made
to have treaties of peace and trade with the Indians, but “[t]hese not
proving successful, war was carried on under the direction and with
the forces of the United states [sic]... The confederation found
congress in the exercise of the same powers of peace and war, in our
relations with Indian nations, as with those of Europe.” 166 The
Articles of Confederation simply adopted this state of affairs:
That instrument [the Articles of Confederation]
surrendered the powers of peace and war to
congress, and prohibited them to the states,
respectively unless the state be actually
invaded.....The 1789 Constitution in contrast
confers “on congress the powers of war and peace;

165
166

Worcester, 31 U.S. at 500.
Id. at 558.
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of making treaties,
commerce....167

and

of

regulating

The Court emphasized the non-international status of the states
when it then asserts that neither the colonies nor later the states could
alter the rights of the tribes because the power of making treaties,
(and breaking treaties) was transferred directly from the British
Crown to the federal government. 168 Despite the 1776 Declaration
of Independence or the 1783 Treaty, for the Court, the transfer of
authority from the Crown to the United States did not include the
recognition of internal and external sovereignty in each of the states.
The authority went from the British Crown directly to the federal
government.
D. Supreme Sovereignty and Tribal Rights in the American System
The collision of national and state governments in the first
decades of the 19th century created a reticence on the part of the
Marshall Court regarding the sovereign premonitions of the
individual states. The Compact Theory, which was the driving
ideological engine for state authority and the concomitant
deprecation of federal authority, was an anathema to those with
nationalistic orientation. 169 In the Marshall Indian cases discussed
above, the Court particularly depreciated the authority and
international sovereignty of individual states when it discussed the
relationship between tribes and the federal government. In many
respects, of course, the Court was commenting on the status of the
states after the establishment of the 1789 constitution. However, the
cases suggest that the Court advocated a more radical position -- that
the states were never actually sovereign in an international or

Id. at 558-599.
“The actual state of things at the time [the founding of the colonies], and all
history since, explain these charters; and the king of Great Britain, at the treaty
of peace, could cede only what belonged to his crown. These newly asserted
titles can derive no aid from the articles so often repeated in Indian treaties;
extending them first, the protection of Great Britain, and afterwards that of the
United States.” Id. at 560.
169 Chief Justice Marshall, for example, noted that: “The argument in all its
forms is essentially the same. It is founded, not on the words of the constitution,
but on its spirit, a spirit extracted, not from the words of the instrument, but from
his view [counsel for Virginia] of the nature of our union and of the great
fundamental principles on which the fabric stands.” Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S.
257, 295 (1821).
167
168
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external sense during and after the revolution, and “states,” they did
not have capacity to create the federal government. This perspective
echoed the Court’s position in McCulloch where Marshall argued
that the states, despite their “international” premonitions, were
incompetent to form a federal union represented by the federal
government.
It has been said, that the people already surrender all
their powers to the State sovereignties and had
nothing more to give. But, surely, the question
whether they may resume and modify the powers
granted to government does not remain settled in this
country. Much more might the legitimacy of the
general government be doubted, had it been created
by the states. The powers delegated to the State
sovereignties were to be exercised by themselves, not
by a distinct and independent sovereignty, created by
themselves. To the formation of a league, such as was
the confederation, the state sovereignties were
certainly competent. But when “in order to form a
more perfect union,” it was necessary to change this
alliance into an effective government, possessing
great and sovereign powers, and acting directly on
the people, the necessity of referring it to the people,
and deriving its powers directly from them, was felt
and acknowledged by all. 170
Because all state action was sub-national, the Lockean concepts
privileging state authority and state claims to Indian lands were also
discarded. The early cases make clear that only the federal
government could claim sovereignty to various Indian lands as
successor in interest to Great Britain where the corresponding state
claimed (based on Locke) that cultivators were more legitimate than
hunters and gatherers.
To the United States, it could be a matter of no
concern, whether their whole territory was devoted
to hunting grounds, or whether an occasional village,
170

McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 404 (1819) (emphasis added).
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and an occasional corn field interrupted, and gave
some variety to the scene. 171
From this perspective, the national government of the United States,
from the Continental Congress through the Confederation Congress,
and the 1789 federal government had always been the pre-eminent
receptacle of the sovereignty of the American people.
This depreciation of state authority embedded tribal rights
within the American legal system as federally guaranteed rights.
Rhetorically, the Court placed the tribes back into the international
sphere and used international law to justify the federal government’s
exclusive authority as a demonstration of its sovereign prerogative
in the domestic and international arenas. As such, from these early
cases until the present, American law has recognized that Indian
tribes retain an international/national character and residual
sovereignty. This sovereignty provides for, among other things, a
right of self-government and guarantees them a possessory interest
in their lands. It also includes a duty of protection and fair dealing
on the part of the United States.
These tribal rights were the result of the judicial recognition that
Indian tribes had a pre-existing sovereignty and independence that
only could be diminished by federal authority. This federal authority
remained exclusive and paramount. The tribes, although analogous
to international states, were not equated with other international
“state” actors such as Great Britain or the federal government. While
the recognition that discovery did not annul their pre-existing rights
arising from the natural right to possession of their lands, it did not
mean that the Indians were entitled to the same “natural rights” that
other individuals and societies had to the lands they occupied.
Instead, it signified that the federal government had the exclusive
right to determine the status of Indians within the legal system -- not
that federal government or federal courts needed to recognize those
rights. The result was an expansion of federal authority under the
Article I commerce power and the plenary power doctrine.172 Under
Worcester, 31 U.S. at 498.
Arguably the Indian commerce clause was not designed to give Congress
exclusive or plenary power over Indian tribes but was designed to resolve
conflicts between the federal and state governments over the management of
commercial and political relationships with the tribes. “The regulation of
commerce with the Indian tribes is very properly unfettered from two limitations
in the articles of confederation, which render the provision obscure and
171
172
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this legal discourse, the fact that an Indian tribe has a treaty with the
federal government did not alter the fact that they are a “conquered”
people who had acquired no rights to their possessions under
international law despite their previous international status. The
treaty rights or common law possessory interests could be
conditioned or subject to statutory diminishment.173 This potential
for defeasement or the unilateral diminishment of Indian legal
authority within the constitutional system is inherent in the federaltribal relationship. For the Court, as set forth in M’Intosh and
reiterated in Worcester, all rights and title in the United States rested
ultimately upon conquest. Conquest, or the act of making war or
extinguishment of title by purchase, resided exclusively in the
national government, and with it, the power to alter the status and
law of conquered peoples. As Native American tribes were held by
the Court to fall within the status of “conquered peoples” regardless
of the actual ability of the United States to establish jurisdiction on
the ground, Federal supremacy and plenary power followed as a
constitutional corollary.

contradictory. The power is there restrained to Indians, not members of any
States, and is not to violate or infringe the legislative right of any State within its
own limits. What description of Indians are to be deemed members of a State, is
not yet settled; and has been a question of frequent perplexity and contention in
Federal Councils. And how the trade with Indians, though not members of a
State, yet residing within its legislative jurisdiction, can be regulated by an
external authority, without so far intruding on their internal rights of legislation,
is absolutely incomprehensible. Federalist 42 (Madison), ALEXANDER
HAMILTON, JAMES MADISON & JOHN JAY, THE FEDERALIST PAPERS (1788).
The basic rules concerning the scope of the power conferred by the commerce
clause within the borders of the United States were set forth in the case Gibbons
v. Ogden and Wilson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Company. Gibbons noted that
the right of commerce derived from "those laws whose authority is
acknowledged by civilized man throughout the world." The Constitution merely
found the existing right and gave the federal government the power to regulate
commerce. States could not hinder free exchange and the right of intercourse
between state and state." This power to prevent certain acts which burden trade
(the dormant commerce clause) did not need to be exercised by the federal
government in order to restrict state action. Blackbird Creek limited the reach of
the dormant commerce clause where the burdens to commerce were incidental
state action which improved local welfare and health. Thus the commerce clause
was intended to remove barriers to trade not confer general powers on the
Federal government. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 27; Wilson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh
Co., 27 U.S. 245 (1829).
173 United States v. Cook, 86 U.S. 591 (1873) (explaining that Indian possessory
interest allows Indians to use lands for whatever purpose provided it is for
improvement); The Cherokee Tabacco Case, 78 U.S. 616 (1870) (explaining
that jurisdiction of United States extends to all territory of United States and
federal statute supersedes earlier federal treaty).
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Nevertheless, the preclusion of state authority in American
Indian jurisprudence has also given rise to legal doctrines that can
be protective of Indian rights against the federal government. These
doctrines justify federal power but also include corresponding
principles legally protective of tribal interests. First, the tribes are
independent entities that possess inherent sovereignty:
The powers of Indian tribes are, in general, "inherent powers
of a limited sovereignty which has never been extinguished."
Before the coming of the Europeans, the tribes were selfgoverning sovereign political communities. Like all sovereign
bodies, they then had the inherent power to prescribe laws for
their members and to punish infractions of those laws.174
This sovereignty, while subject to complete extinguishment and
regulation by Congress, nevertheless remains an independent source
of authority over tribal members and land. It can also provide a basis
for the replacement of state regulation with tribal regulation of offreservation usufructuary activities.
Second, the opinions in Cherokee Nation, and more particularly
in Worcester, held that the tribe had the contractual capacity to
create legally binding obligations that are enforceable in federal and
state courts. The 1789 Constitution made treaties self-executing, but
the issue of contractual capacity had not been addressed. The British
Crown and other European governments had entered into treaties of
cession that recognized the sovereign authority of the aboriginal
chiefs, but attitudes were changing – even as the federal government
implemented a policy of conciliation, treaty making, and civilization
towards the tribes. Anger over indigenous hostility and violence
directed at settlers; frustration over the rejection of Christianity and
“civilization”; the idea of Manifest Destiny; as well as the growing
acceptance of “scientific” theories which posited that related race to
lower intellectual prowess and cultural development, led many
Americans to conclude that Native Americans were inferior and
borne to servitude.175
United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322-323 (1978) (citations omitted).
As stated by historian Alden Vaughan: “A certain type of cultural relativity
and moral absolutism combined…to show that though white and red man were
of the same biological mould, the Indian possessed customs that fitted him
perfectly to his level of development in the history of man, but the level was far
174
175
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These attitudes spilled over into the legal system. “Where is the
rule to stop?” asked Justice Johnson as he argued against the notion
that the Cherokee constituted a state in Cherokee Nation: “Must
every petty kraal of Indians, designating themselves a tribe or
nation, and having a few hundred acres of land to hunt on
exclusively, be recognized as a state?” 176 Nevertheless, the
Worcester majority simply held that the contractual capacity related
to self-government, the status of the other contracting party, and the
use of a treaty was a political decision of the federal government. 177
This act of recognition itself was arguably an act only an
international sovereign could make.178
Third, treaty making process is circumscribed by the Reserved
Rights Doctrine. The existence and continued traction of the
Reserved Rights doctrine with its corresponding reservation of
usufructuary hunting, fishing, and gathering rights owes its
existence to judicial recognition of the tribe’s diminished
sovereignty and independent character. On one hand, the doctrine
can be understood in contract terms: as an application of rule
construing an agreement against the drafter, as a recognition that
contracts involving land must use precise language, and that implied
terms of a contract must not be contrary to the underlying purposes
of the agreement. On the other hand, the Reserved Rights doctrine
is due to recognition that the tribes retain a diminished international
sovereignty and right of self-government over a particular territory.
While the national government holds radical title to the territory, the
fee is united only by cession or a conquest i.e. it is sourced in a grant
inferior to that of the white European. The savage was the zero point of human
society. ALDEN T. VAUGHAN, ROOTS OF AMERICAN RACISM: ESSAYS ON THE
COLONIAL EXPERIENCE 21-22 (Oxford Univ. Press, 1995); ROBERT F.
BERKHOFER, JR., SALVATION AND THE SAVAGE: AN ANALYSIS OF PROTESTANT
MISSION AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN RESPONSE, 1787-1862 11 (Univ. of Ky.,
1977).
176 Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 25.
177 In his Worcester concurrence, Justice M’Lean was explicit that selfgovernment, not sovereignty, was crucial to contractual capacity. It is said that
these treaties are nothing more than compacts, which cannot be considered as
obligatory on the United States, from a want of power in the Indians to enter into
them. He writes “ What is a treaty? The answer is, it is a compact formed
between two nations or communities, having the right of self -government. Is it
essential that each party shall possess the same attributes of sovereignty, to give
force to the treaty? This will not be pretended: for, on this ground, very few
valid treaties could be formed. The only requisite is, that each of the contracting
parties shall possess the right of self -government, and the power to perform the
stipulations of the treaty.” Worcester, 31 U.S. at 581.
178 See Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. 241, 271 (1808).
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of pre-existing allodial rights from a previously subsisting legal
entity. Indeed, courts have continuously recognized and applied the
idea that treaties with Indians are analogous to international treaties.
“[T]he powers to make treaties with the Indian tribes is,” the Court
stated in United States v. Forty-Three Gallons of Whiskey,
“…coextensive with that to make treaties with foreign nations.” 179
Under international law rules of treaty interpretation, the
relinquishment of these pre-existing rights, either self-government
or implied rights which enable the continued existence of the
contracting party, such as hunting rights, is preserved by treaty
unless explicitly extinguished.180
United States v. Forty-Three Gallons of Whiskey, 93 U.S. 188, 197 (1876).
The foreign nature of the individual Indians and the tribes was contrasted with
that of slaves in the infamous Dred Scott case by Chief Justice Taney. Taney
wrote “The situation of this [the slave] population was altogether unlike that of
the Indian race. The latter, it is true, formed no part of the colonial
communities, and never amalgamated with them in social connections or in
government. But although they were uncivilized, they were yet a free and
independent people, associated together in nations or tribes, and governed by
their own laws. Many of these political communities were situated in territories
to which the white race claimed the ultimate right of dominion. But that claim
was acknowledged to be subject to the right of the Indians to occupy it as long
as they thought proper, and neither the English nor colonial Governments
claimed or exercised any dominion over the tribe or nation by whom it was
occupied, nor claimed the right to the possession of the territory, until the tribe
or nation consented to cede it. These Indian Governments were regarded and
treated as foreign Governments, as much so as if an ocean had separated the red
man from the white; and their freedom has constantly been acknowledged, from
the time of the first emigration to the English colonies to the present day, by the
different Governments which succeeded each other. Treaties have been
negotiated with them, and their alliance sought for in war; and the people who
compose these Indian political communities have always been treated as
foreigners not living under our Government. It is true that the course of events
has brought the Indian tribes within the limits of the United States under
subjection to the white race; and it has been found necessary, for their sake as
well as our own, to regard them as in a state of pupillage, and to legislate to a
certain extent over them and the territory they occupy. But they may, without
doubt, like the subjects of any other foreign Government, be naturalized by the
authority of Congress, and become citizens of a State, and of the United States;
and if an individual should leave his nation or tribe, and take up his abode
among the white population, he would be entitled to all the rights and privileges
which would belong to an emigrant from any other foreign people.” Dred Scott
v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 403-404 (1857).
180 Vattel, supra note 33, at 3-4. I do not mean to argue that international law
rules control the federal, state and tribe relationship or that there has be a direct
incorporation of international law rules of treaty interpretation into American
Indian law. This would ignore the Discovery Doctrine which presumes that
international law rules do not apply. I simply note that international rules
regarding consent and the scope of agreement between sovereigns and the
179
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Related to Reserved Rights doctrine is the recognition of residual
sovereignty, which provides a mechanism for the exercise of tribal
law and authority over areas outside the territorial boundaries of the
reservation. Within the context of the state-federal disputes,
sovereignty was considered co-extensive with territory, but tribal
sovereignty was articulated as sovereignty over its members. The
state may hold sovereignty and authority over the territory within
borders, but tribal sovereignty, or control and jurisdiction over tribal
members, remained in the tribe, guaranteed by and subject to federal
authority. Absent federal action to diminish this sovereignty, the
right to regulate tribal membership remains both an inherent right
and a federally guaranteed right. This right of regulation over
members has been an important aspect in the exercise of offreservation hunting, fishing, and gathering rights. In many
circumstances’ tribal regulation of members outside of the
reservation can supersede to state regulation.
Fourth, American Law has incorporated a more extensive and
legally enforceable notion of federal fiduciary obligation towards
the tribes than those recognized in other common law settler states
such as Canada and New Zealand. The anomalous position of tribes
arising from their prior occupation, possession and defense of
territory in North America coupled with the inapplicability of
Anglo-American legal and constitutional categories, has given rise
to federal fiduciary and trust obligations towards the tribes and tribal
property. These obligations interpose federal authority between the
tribes and the individual states and provide a legally enforceable
standard on federal action. 181 In addition, this process led to the
interpretation of treaties have influenced the legal interpretation of Indian
treaties and statutory agreements.
181 “These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. They are communities
dependent on the United States. Dependent largely for their daily food.
Dependent for their political rights. They owe no allegiance to the States, and
receive from them no protection. Because of the local ill feeling, the people of
the States where they are found are often their deadliest enemies. From their
very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the
Federal Government with them and the treaties in which it has been promised,
there arises the duty of protection, and with it the power. This has always been
recognized by the Executive and by Congress, and by this court, whenever the
question has arisen.” United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383-844 (1886);
“Our construction of these statutes and regulations [relating to federal
management of forests owned by the tribe or allottees within the reservation] is
reinforced by the undisputed existence of a general trust relationship between
the United States and the Indian people. This Court has previously emphasized

214

development of the protective canons of treaty interpretation. 182 In
the legal analysis relating to the substance of treaty negotiations the
doctrine and canons create a presumption that the United States
would not use its superior power and knowledge to the detriment of
the tribes and interprets treaty language in a manner more solicitous
of tribal perspectives.
More significantly this reasoning led to the Court to hold that
treaties were legal obligations rather than simply non-enforceable
political commitments of Congress and the Executive. The federal
government had inherited this duty of protection from the British
Crown and it remained a primary justification for federal resistance
to state assertions of jurisdiction over the tribes. Nevertheless, where
the Indians gained some traction in treaty law, the fiduciary
relationship and the political nature of the tribal-federal relationship
been also used to diminish tribal authority. In the late 19th century,
as might expected by the discussion above, the fiduciary relationship
was used as justification for the exercise of plenary federal power
over the tribes and the increased use of the Political Question
doctrine to dispense with treaty protections.183
“the distinctive obligation of trust incumbent upon the Government in its
dealings with these dependent and sometimes exploited people.” United States
v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 225 (1983) (citing Navajo Tribe v. United States, 624
F.2d 981 (Ct. Cl. 1980)).
182 “[T]he canons of construction applicable in Indian law are rooted in the
unique trust relationship between the United States and the Indians.” Two such
canons are directly applicable in this case: first, the States may tax Indians only
when Congress has manifested clearly its consent to such taxation second,
statutes are to be construed liberally in favor of the Indians, with ambiguous
provisions interpreted to their benefit.” Montana. v. Blackfeet, 471 U.S. 759,
766 (1985) (citing County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 247
1985); Choatte v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665 (1912). “In construing any treaty between
the United States and an Indian tribe, it must always…be borne in mind that the
negotiations for the treaty are conducted, on the part of the United States, an
enlightened and powerful nation, by representatives skilled in diplomacy,
masters of a written language, understanding the modes and forms of creating
the various technical estates known to their law, and assisted by their own
language; that the Indians, on the other hand, are a weak and dependent people,
who have no written language and are wholly unfamiliar with all the forms of
legal expression, and whose only knowledge of the terms in which the treaty is
framed is that imparted to them by the interpreter employed by the United
States; and that the treaty must therefore be construed, not according to the
technical meaning of its words to learned lawyers, but in the sense in which they
would naturally be understood by the Indians.” Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 1011 (1899) (citation omitted).
183 Kagama, 118 U.S. at 384. The political question doctrine was most forcefully
articulated in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, which presumes that Congressional
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Finally, the federal government has plenary and exclusive
authority over Indian tribes. 184 In United States v. Kagama, the
Court following the logic of the Marshall trilogy, stated that
Congress had complete power as a trustee over the tribes and it had
the complete authority and power to determine when tribal selfgovernment would end. The Court held this authority not to be one
of the enumerated powers in the constitution but held it was the
result of the federal governments “course of dealing” with the tribes
from which had risen a “duty of protection and with it the power.” 185
actions with regard to Indians are not subject to review by the courts. Lone Wolf,
187 U.S. at 566; It was never fully accepted by the U.S. Supreme Court even at
the time it was articulated. In Delaware Tribal Business Committee v. Weeks,
the Court noted that government authority over tribal property, although plenary
may be challenged when the governmental action infringes on constitutional
rights because Indian rights are rooted within the constitution. Delaware Tribal
Business Committee v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1977).
184 “The Constitution vests the Federal Government with exclusive authority
over relations with Indian tribes.” Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759,
764 (1985) (citing U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3).
185 The major sources of federal authority over the tribes are the commerce
clause, the treaty power, the property clause and the trust relationship that the
federal government owes the tribes due to their dependent status. Art. I, § 8, cl.
3. of the U.S. Constitution states that Congress shall have the power “To
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian Tribes….” As the federal government ceased signing treaties
with the tribes in 1871 this clause has become a more important source of
federal authority. The treaty power and the supremacy clause found in Art. IV
“[t]his Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in
pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the
judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws
of any State to the contrary notwithstanding”; incorporate federal foreign affairs
power and international law principles into the federal-tribe relationship. The
trust relationship is premised on the dependent status of the tribes and is a
structural aspect of the tribal-state-federal relationship. As the U.S. Supreme
Court noted in United States v. Kagama: “These Indian tribes are the wards of
the nation. They are communities dependent on the United States--dependent
largely for their daily food; dependent for their political rights. They owe no
allegiance to the States and receive from them no protection. Because of the
local ill feeling, the people of the States where they are found are often their
deadliest enemies. From their very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to
the course of dealing of the Federal Government with them and the treaties in
which it has been promised, there arises the duty of protection, and with it the
power. This has always been recognized by the Executive and by Congress, and
by this court, whenever the question has arisen.” Kagama, 118 U.S. at 383-344;
The courts have also found that the federal government has authority over the
tribes and the states derived from its fee ownership of Indian lands. U.S. CONST.
art. IV, sec. 3, cl. 2 states in part that: “The Congress shall have power to
dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or
other property belonging to the United States….”; In United States v. Winans,

216

As such, the power to regulate Indian tribes is completely federal.
This regulatory authority enables the federal government to legally
disregard treaty rights as well as terminate legal recognition of tribal
entities if it so chooses.186 States are excluded from extending their
jurisdiction and regulation to Indian tribes and land unless
specifically authorized by Congress. This is so even in those areas
constitutionally deemed to be important aspects of state sovereignty
such as control over natural resources. 187
IV.

CONCLUSION

This paper has argued that the federal state conflict which
occurred prior to the American Civil War informed the judicial
decision-making in early Indian jurisprudence and these
institutional disputes have had a significant impact on the existence
and scope of Native American Law in the United States.
It is clear that the Marshall Court did not agree that the federal
government and the States were co-equal sovereigns nor was their
Justice McKinna quoted: “By the Constitution, as is now well settled, the United
States, having rightfully acquired the Territories, and being the only
Government which can impose laws upon them, have the entire dominion and
sovereignty, national and municipal, Federal and State, over all the Territories,
so long as they remain in a territorial condition.” United States v. Winans, 198
U.S. 371, 383-384 (1905) (citing Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1, 38 (1893));
“The extinguishment of the Indian title, opening the land for settlement and
preparing the way for future States, were appropriate to the objects for which the
United States held the Territory. And surely it was within the competency of the
Nation to secure to the Indians such a remnant of the great rights they possessed
as "taking fish at all usual and accustomed places." Nor does it restrain the State
unreasonably, if at all, in the regulation of the right. It only fixes in the land
such easements as enables the right to be exercised.” Winans, 198 U.S. at 383384; See also Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power over Indians: Its Sources,
Scope and Limitations, 132 UNIV. of PA. L. REV.195 (1984).
186 For example, The Menominee Termination Act established a mechanism to
“to provide for orderly termination of Federal supervision over the property and
members” of the tribe. Under its provisions, the tribe was to formulate a plan for
future control of tribal property and service functions theretofore conducted by
the United States. Once approved the tribe’s relationship with the federal
government would be severed and its property and members would become
subject to the law of the state within which their reservation was located. Local
governance structures in the state would be extended into the former reservation.
The Menominee Termination Act, 68 Stat. 250 (1954).
187 For example, Justice O’Connor writing for the majority, stated in Mille Lacs
v. Minnesota; “Although States have important interests in regulating wildlife
and natural resources within their borders, this authority is shared with the
Federal Government when the Federal Government exercises one of its
enumerated constitutional powers, such as treaty making.” Minnesota v. Mille
Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 204 (1999).
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relative authority and power in the federal system reciprocal. The
federal government penetrated the states, but a state could not
assert their jurisdiction in areas of federal authority -- particularly
in those areas that involved fundamental issues of sovereignty like
“war and peace,” “treaties,” and “title to and jurisdiction over
territory.” In this sense, the federal government is (and was)
“more” sovereign. It has both internal and external sovereignty. It
existed on both the domestic and international plane. It claimed
jurisdiction over the entire area and population of the United States
as the Lockean civil society. Each state, on the other hand, while
“sovereign,” was analogous to a tribe in that it held a “diminished
sovereignty” within the federal system. Unlike a tribe, however,
its residual sovereign powers had nothing whatsoever to do with
the fundamental legal issues of war and peace. Indeed, with the
Union victory in American Civil War, the logic of absolute federal
authority as set forth in Kagama became manifest. Ironically, the
legal basis of the continued or renewed exercise of treaty rights has
been bound up in the same determination of paramount and
exclusive federal authority. These rights include the legally
enforceable nature of Indian treaties, Reserved Rights doctrine, the
fiduciary duty toward the tribes, and the protective canons of treaty
interpretation.
The Marshall Court, by analogizing tribes to foreign states and
recognizing their independence and self-government as collective
entities, provided a framework through which the tribes were
incorporated into the federal system. Yet despite these positive
rights, the vindication of federal authority resulted in the legal
determination that the federal government holds exclusive and
absolute power over the tribes. This power is not the power and
authority as understood in liberal theory and falls short of genuine
federal relationship subsisting between the federal government and
the tribes. Tribal collectivities are not constitutive of the national
state; they are excluded from the Lockean contract by which state
authority is legitimated in American political theory. Rather, they
are “subjects,” analogous to conquered people in law in that their
legal entitlements and rights are essentially non-protected and
subject to defeasement at the will of the sovereign national
American state. While the constitution explicitly recognized the
existence of Indians and Indian tribes, accommodations for their
“dependent” status and natural rights, using accepted categories of
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international law and natural law, were available. This is not to say
that racial intolerance, bigotry, and greed did not also diminish the
fortunes of the tribes in their quest to protect their lands and right
to self-government.188 The white European settlers and citizens of
the United States may have simply been unwilling to recognize any
legal or political protections for the Indians, regardless of the
fulminations of legal scholars and courts.

The Constitution mentions Indians and Tribes two times. In both in the
Indian Commerce Clause; “foreign nations, states and Indian tribes” and in the
so-called "Indians not taxed" clause. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Art. I, § 2. Indians were
considered members to be members of their respective tribes rather than citizens
or property (as in the case of African American slaves under Dred Scott).
188
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